International Policy Coordination and Emerging-Market Economies

  • Barry Eichengreen


This paper considers the debate over international economic policy coordination from an emerging-market standpoint. Since the global financial crisis, officials in emerging markets have been critical of the conventional and unconventional policies of advanced countries for failing to take into account their global spillover effects. I evaluate these criticisms through the dual lenses of theory and policy. Two important distinctions for evaluating these claims are the distinction between international policy coordination (the mutual adjustment of policies) and international cooperation (including information sharing) and between cooperation on monetary issues and financial issues. I conclude that the cases are strongest for international cooperation and for focusing on financial questions, respectively.


Monetary Policy Central Bank Fiscal Policy Federal Reserve Advanced Country 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer India 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.UC BerkeleyBerkeleyUSA

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