Cost Sharing

  • T. V. S. Ramamohan Rao


Why and how do contracting parties share variable and/or fixed costs? How are the revenue and cost sharing agreements affected by an expectation of premature termination? How will fixed assets be shared if dissolution occurs without prior notice? These and other related questions will be examined utilizing a synthetic principal agent framework. The analysis centers around three effects of cost sharing: integrity effect, incentive effect, and control effect. Though somewhat fragmented, the available empirical literature, pertaining to many areas of application, will be summarized to disentangle the forces behind cost sharing in contractual relations.


Variable Cost Systemic Risk Fixed Cost Cost Sharing Brand Equity 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer India 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • T. V. S. Ramamohan Rao
    • 1
  1. 1.Indian Institute of Technology KanpurKanpurIndia

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