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Corruption: Supply-Side and Demand-Side Solutions

  • Avinash K. Dixit
Chapter
Part of the India Studies in Business and Economics book series (ISBE)

Abstract

As any other economic transaction, corruption too has demand and supply dimensions. The focus thus far has been on the demand side, viz., government trying to control its own officials. Dixit shifts the attention to the supply side, viz., firms. He proposes that business community itself could set a norm of ‘no bribes’ and enforce it through ostracism such as ‘not doing business with those firms who give bribes’. Dixit suggests that largest firms could potentially take the lead as they may be better able to withstand initial losses till the norm takes roots.

Keywords

Trade Credit Business Community Government Contract Corrupt Practice Contract Enforcement 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer India 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Princeton UniversityPrincetonUSA

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