Sharecropping in Theory and Practice: A Selective Review

  • Debapriya Sen
Part of the India Studies in Business and Economics book series (ISBE)


Sharecropping has remained a dominant agrarian institution around the world. There is a large, and growing, literature that has studied this institution from both theoretical and empirical points of view. This chapter presents a review of the literature on sharecropping. Complementing earlier reviews (e.g., Quibria and Rashid, World Dev 12:103–114, 1984; Otsuka and Hayami, Econ Dev Cult Change 37:31–68, 1988; Singh 1989), our approach is purposely selective. After presenting some aspects of the risk-based theories of sharecropping, we discuss certain alternative theories given in the more recent literature. We also comment on some implications of this institution specific to agrarian economies in transition.


Limited Liability Risk Sharing Contracting Parti Side Payment Total Surplus 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



This chapter was written when I was visiting the Department of Economics, Jadavpur University, whose warm hospitality and research support are gratefully acknowledged.


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Copyright information

© Springer India 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsRyerson UniversityTorontoCanada

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