Cognition, Emotion, and Volition

Abstract

The choice of the three topics covered in this chapter is suggested by the parallel between the traditional Indian view of jīva or person as who knows (jnatā), enjoys/suffers (bhoktā) and acts as an agent (kartā) on the one hand, and the trilogy of cognition, emotion and volition in modern psychology on the other. In view of the vast material on the nature of cognition found in the writings of many schools of Indian thought, only the views of Śaṅkara’s Advaita are discussed here in some detail. Placing his views against the backdrop of the world view of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, Śaṅkara points out the inherent limitations of the human cognitive apparatus. There is a natural tendency to understand new experience in light of old, which limits what is given in experience, while the tendency to add elements based on past experience leads to distortion. The constructivist notions of cognition in the Advaita are pointed out, and the Advaitic meditation is explained in terms of cognitive deconstruction of the ego. Moving to traditional Indian views of emotion, the concept of rasa, or aesthetic moods in Bharata’s dramaturgical thesis is explained. Given that the dramatic presentation of emotions often leads to a simultaneously shared experience of members of the audience, the transformation of emotion in aesthetic moods is recognized as a trans-individual phenomenon. We then explain how dramaturgical insights about the nature of emotions are used in explaining the nature of spiritual development in religious devotion. The last third of the chapter discusses Indian views of volition within the context of the Doctrine of karma, and the principles underlying karma-yoga primarily following the Bhagavad-Gītā. Finally we interpret the principles underlying karma-yoga in light of relevant concepts in contemporary psychology.