Abstract
In this paper we consider the auction framework of cognitive radio network consisting of a set of primary users and a set of secondary users (SUs). The spectrum has been divided into channels with the help of frequency division multiple access (FDMA). The primary users (PUs) are licensed users who lease the vacant channels to secondary user (SUs) temporarily by auction mechanism. In this paper we try to form an algorithm to determine the secondary user who wins the auction. We also discuss the effect of change of number of users on bandwidth utilization, channel utility and revenue generation by using the algorithm.
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Bhattacharjee, S., Bhattacharya, A. (2015). Winner Determination Algorithm in Auction Framework of Cognitive Radio Network. In: Maharatna, K., Dalapati, G., Banerjee, P., Mallick, A., Mukherjee, M. (eds) Computational Advancement in Communication Circuits and Systems. Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering, vol 335. Springer, New Delhi. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2274-3_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2274-3_13
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