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Inequality, Polarization and Conflict pp 109–120Cite as

Fractionalization, Polarization, and Conflict

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Part of the book series: Economic Studies in Inequality, Social Exclusion and Well-Being ((EIAP,volume 12))

Abstract

Inequality in income distribution in a country has often been regarded as one of the determinants of social conflict. The index of fractionalization has been widely used in different studies to link ethno-linguistic diversity to conflict, growth, or public good provision. The subject of Chap. 7 is a study on the effects of inequality, fractionalization, and polarization on social conflict. There is a rigorous discourse on the relationship between fractionalization, inequality, and polarization. The role of inequality, polarization, and fractionalization in conflict is examined in a broad structure.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For further discussion, see Dasgupta (1985), on which this brief presentation relies.

  2. 2.

    There have been applications of altruistic behavior to many situations, including study of cooperatives (Sen 1966), voting behavior (Fowler 2006; Edin et al. 2007; and Evren 2009), intergenerational models (Barro and Becker 1989), joint decisions (Bell and Keeney 2009), and deprivation (Chakravarty 2009a).

  3. 3.

    Contests have been used to analyze several issues, including rent seeking (Tullock 1980; Nitzan 1991; Baye et al. 1993), conflicts (Hirshleifer 1991; Skaperdas 1992), tournaments (Rosen 1986), and political campaigns (Skaperdas and Grofman 1995). A general treatment of contests can be found in Dixit (1986)

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Economic Research Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India

    Satya R. Chakravarty

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Chakravarty, S.R. (2015). Fractionalization, Polarization, and Conflict. In: Inequality, Polarization and Conflict. Economic Studies in Inequality, Social Exclusion and Well-Being, vol 12. Springer, New Delhi. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2166-1_7

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