Abstract
Despite their national power indicators, India and China’s 4,000-odd-km boundary dispute continues to evoke uncertainty in their bilateral equations. A series of measures were undertaken in 1978, 1993, 1996 and 2011–2012 to address matters, but both nations have enhanced their military presence and modernisation, leaving the boundary dispute unresolved and leading to speculation about regional stability. Several legal and political suggestions have been put forward to resolve this issue; yet, each side cites difficulties in going ahead. Functionally divided into western, middle and eastern sectors, the boundary dispute evokes strong sentiments in both countries, though the increasing nationalist rhetoric in China on the issue is of recent vintage. This paper argues that until both countries resolve this issue, tensions can be expected to spiral, affecting bilateral relations for years and decades to come. That said, it isn’t as though it is a case of clear and present danger for the two.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
For details, see ‘China’, at http://www.boundaries.com/ibm_idx.htm#china, accessed on 22 March 2003. For a comparative study of various dispute resolutions involving China and its neighbours, M. Taylor Fravel (2008).
- 2.
Mohan Guruswamy and Zorawar Daulet Singh (2009, p.vii). They suggest that some Chinese have ‘activat[ed]… a non-existent dispute in the eastern sector’ (p. 3). See also ‘India–China Territorial Dispute: Way Ahead’, Centre for Land and Warfare Studies (CLAWS) Article 1933 (25 August 2011), at http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=934&u_id=36, accessed on 9 September 2013.
- 3.
Contrary to the general opinion that the LAC was established following the 1962 clashes along the entire stretch of the India–China border, Pravin Sawhney argues that it came into being only in the western sector in the immediate aftermath of the 1962 clashes, covering about 320 km from Daulat Beg Oldi to Demchok in Ladakh. Subsequently, by the 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity, the LAC was extended to the entire border. According to Sawhney, by the 1993 agreement the LAC could be changed by military presence/force. See Pravin Sawhney (2002, pp. 21–22).
- 4.
In 1960, the first two meetings were held in Beijing, in June and July; the next two in New Delhi, in August and September; and the last in Rangoon, in December.
- 5.
See ‘Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India–China Border Areas’, China Report (Vol. 30, No. 1, 1994, pp. 101–119); and ‘Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Confidence Building Measures along the Line of Actual Control in the India–China Border Areas’, China Report (Vol. 33, No. 2, 1997, pp. 241–247).
- 6.
Wu Yongnian, for instance, argued in the Liberation Daily that this sector should not be considered a part of the dispute at all. See Ananth Krishnan (2012).
- 7.
On the Chinese perspective see, Wang Hongwei (1998); Zhao Weiwen (2000); Selected Documents on Sino-Indian Relations (December 1961–May 1962) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1962, pp. 17–21); and Premier Chou En-lai [Zhou Enlai]’s Letter to the Leaders of Asian and African Countries on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question (15 November 1962) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1974), p. 10.
- 8.
While Pakistan, in its 1962 official Survey of Pakistan map, claimed jurisdiction up to areas near Qizil Ribat, Konlik and other areas that were far north of the traditional international boundaries of Jammu and Kashmir, and inclusive of vast tracts of Xinjiang, it settled in 1963 for far less—a difference of more than 31,000 km2 of claimed area, which went to China. It also appeared that Pakistan completely ignored, in the 1963 settlement, the fact that the Mirs of Hunza possessed customary rights over the grazing lands in the region. Likewise, the Chinese official map of 1960 was pitched far beyond the traditional international frontier that starts south of the Karakoram pass, and included areas east till Sia Pass, Shimshal Pass up to Kilik Dawan. However, the traditional international frontiers ran eastwards from Karakorum Pass through Marpo Pass, Aghil Pass, Kunjerab Pass (between Karakorum and Kunjerab passes, well north of the Sakshgam river), Parpik Pass, Karchanai Pass, Mintaka Pass and so on. In fact, as Dobell cited, the Postal Maps of China published in 1917, reprinted in 1919 and 1933, confirm to most of this traditional frontier. Finally, by the agreement signed on 2 March 1963, Pakistan claimed to have received about 1,900 km2 of land from China (mainly for making salt at Shamshal and other grazing grounds), access or in some cases part control, of some passes in the region. See W.M. Dobell (1964) and A.G. Noorani (2011). Noorani argued that British and independent Indian considerations on the border underwent innumerable discussions, with two schools emerging on the idea that Indian borders with China in the western sector in Jammu and Kashmir should be fixed with the Kunlun or Karakoram mountains, while McMahon Line in the eastern sector predominated. He suggests that despite several reminders from the British Indian side in 1846, 1847, 1899 and 1905, the Chinese leaders were unable to show clearly where their claim area lay. Even today, after, three decades of discussions, it is said that the Chinese have never shown their boundary maps. On the other hand, interestingly, Noorani cites evidence to the effect that the Xinjiang maps of 1893 exclude Aksai Chin from Chinese control (ibid., p. 140).
- 9.
On the Indian perspective, see Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements signed between the Government of India and China 1954–1959; Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Sino-Pakistan “Agreement” March 2, 1963, Some Facts’, 16 March 1963; K. Natwar Singh (2009), V.C. Bhutani (1985), D.K. Banerjee (1985), Karunakar Gupta (1981), Hriday Nath Kaul (2003), and Parshotam Mehra (1992).
- 10.
The territorial dispute in this region has led to China exerting pressure on India in the international arena. For instance, in January 2009, China opposed a US$2.9 billion aid project from the Asian Development Bank for developmental projects in Arunachal Pradesh in India.
- 11.
- 12.
A couple of months after the publication of Jing Hui’s article and a month before the seventh round of discussions, in June 1986, about 40 Chinese, including some in uniform, intruded 6–7 km into the Kameng division of Arunachal Pradesh, in the Thangdong grazing area in the vicinity of Samdurong Chu. Though accusations of intrusions from both sides were not new, this time the Chinese stayed back. Gradually, their number increased to about 200. The choice of Samdurong Chu was obvious: it was close to the 4,115 m Zing La Pass in Tawang district. A Jeep-able road from the Tibetan plateau comes right up to it on the McMahon Line on the Chinese side. Within 80 km from this point there were three major Chinese military establishments, with helipads and modern communication aids. The Chinese moved in at least three new brigades of troops closer to this area, next to Yong Gyalpa. In addition, the Yun-8 transports ferried large Sikorsky helicopters into Tibet. China also deployed a squadron of J-7 (MiG-21) aircraft at Gonggar airfield, 95 km from Lhasa and situated at 3,560 m. With the introduction of these fighter aircraft and S-70 Black Hawk helicopters, China enhanced its fighting and logistics capabilities in the region. This incident resulted in the Indian armed forces launching Operation Checkerboard. The Indian army started on a modernisation programme, including plans for 11 mountain divisions and deployed Bofors guns to these areas. Chinese military writings of the time indicated that the kill ratio in the simulated war games was very high, that is, for every one Indian casualty, there were ten Chinese ones, thus reversing the 1962 figures. The war games appeared to have rattled the Chinese, who in the eighth meeting of border talks during 11–15 November 1987 at New Delhi suggested setting up of a demilitarised zone in eastern sector, while India suggested for such measures all across the LAC.
- 13.
Mishra cited by Iftikhar Gilani, ‘India is Stuck in a Hostile Neighbourhood: Mishra’, at http://archive.tehelka.com/story_main50.asp?filename=Ws151011National_Security.asp, 15 October 2011, accessed on 17 October 2011.
- 14.
On the negative side, in November 2006, on the eve of President Hu Jintao’s visit to India, Ambassador Sun Yuxi made a statement reiterating Beijing’s claim to a major portion of Arunachal Pradesh. This appeared to have marred the outcome of the second such visit by the Chinese president. This was followed by the local people’s representative, Member of Parliament Kiren Rijiju’s, accusation, based on local reports, that China has moved 20 km inside Arunachal Pradesh. The reports indicated a gameplan similar to the Chinese occupation of paramilitary outposts nearer to those vacated by the Indian side, such as opposite Khurnag Fort in Ladakh. While there were reports of China’s physical entry into Tawang district since 2004, recent official claims appeared to be backed by physical occupation of large tracts of land in Samdurong Chu valley, the Asaphila and Lungar camps, grazing lands and strategic heights. To recall, while withdrawing 20 km after the 1962 march of 40 km, Chinese troops have specifically occupied strategic areas like the Diphu Pass and others that could be crucial for further military operations into the valleys. Naturally, these troops enjoy geographical advantages of higher altitudes in the region. Such a prospect poses an uphill task for the Indian ground forces in any future skirmish. Although, the Chinese troops were not mobilised generally against India, such a prospect of opening a ‘two-theatre war’ has appeared possible, specifically in relation to Pakistan. Indeed, during the Kargil war of 1999, the Chinese army reportedly moved into disputed territories in the Tuting-Machula sector, losing yaks in the Kameng sector (all in Arunachal Pradesh). In the same year, a Chinese border post at Pongthong in Tibet reportedly laid mule tracks and mule bridges at Galaitakrui (about 4,267 m). On 15 October 2000, the chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh, Mukul Mithi, accused the Chinese army of making repeated incursions into the region and built a mule trail in the Kaila Pass in Dibang valley district.
References
Banerjee DK (1985) Sino-Indian border dispute. Intellectual Publishing House, New Delhi
Bhutani VC (1985) What boundary question? Sino-Indian or Indo-Tibetan? China Rep 21(5):427–430
Chen Tiqiang (1982) ZhongYin bianjie wenti de falu fangmian (Legal aspects of the China–India territorial issue). Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (International Studies) No. 1:11–42
Dobell WM (1964) Ramifications of the China–Pakistan Border Treaty. Pac Aff 37(3):283–295
Ganguly S (1989) The Sino-Indian border talks, 1981–1989: a view from New Delhi. Asian Surv 29(12):1123–1135
Gupta K (1981) A note on source material on the Sino-Indian border dispute—Western Sector. China Rep 17(3):51–55
Guruswamy M, Singh ZD (2009) India China relations: the border issue and beyond. Viva Books Private Limited, New Delhi
Jing Hui (1986) Youguan Zhong-Yin bianjie zhengduan di yixie qingkuang he beijing (Some facts about the background of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute). Guoji Wenti Yanjiu No. 2:1–8, 62
Kaul HN (2003) India China boundary in Kashmir. Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi
Krishnan A (2012) Month after border talks, Chinese paper says Aksai Chin is a closed chapter. Hindu, 16 February 2012. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/month-after-border-talks-chinese-paper-says-aksai-chin-is-a-closed-chapter/article2897629.ece. Accessed 9 Sept 2013
Liu Gengsheng (2005) “Maikemahongxian” yu dang’an banben yinmou (The plot of the McMahon Line). Beijing Dang’an (Beijing Archives), May 2005, pp 36–38
Mehra P (1992) An ‘agreed’ frontier: Ladakh and India’s northernmost borders 1846–1947. Oxford University Press, New Delhi
Natwar Singh K (2009) My China Diary 1956–88. Rupa, New Delhi
Noorani AG (2011) India–China boundary problem, 1846–1947: history and diplomacy. Oxford University Press, New Delhi
Sawhney P (2002) The defence makeover: 10 myths that shape India’s image. Sage Publications, New Delhi
Taylor Fravel M (2008) Strong borders secure nation: cooperation and conflict in China’s territorial disputes. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Wang Hongwei (1998) Qimalayashan qingjie: Zhongyin guanxi Yanjiu (The Himalayas sentiment: a study of Sino-Indian relations). Zhongguo Zangxue Chubanshe, Beijing
Yu Haiyang (2001) Zhongmian bianjie tiaoyue–qianding shimo (The whole story of China–Myanmar border agreement). Waijiao Fengyun (Diplomatic Winds), January 2001 pp 29–32
Zhao Weiwen (2000) Yinzhong guanxi fengyun lu 1949–1999 (Record of stormy India–China relations, 1949–1999). Shishi Chubanshe, Beijing
Zhou Enlai (1989) Report on the question of the boundary line between China and Burma, July 9, 1957. In: Selected works of Zhou Enlai, vol 2. Foreign Languages Press, Beijing
Zhu Zhaohua (2010) “Makemahongxian” wenti de zhenglun ji qi jiejue (The dispute and resolution of the McMahon Line). Suzhou Sci Technol J 27(6):61–65
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2015 Springer India
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Kondapalli, S. (2015). Fence Sitting, Prolonged Talks: The India–China Boundary Dispute. In: Naidu, G., Chen, M., Narayanan, R. (eds) India and China in the Emerging Dynamics of East Asia. Springer, New Delhi. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2138-8_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2138-8_7
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, New Delhi
Print ISBN: 978-81-322-2137-1
Online ISBN: 978-81-322-2138-8
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)