Abstract
An important manifestation of inequality in the labour market is the inequality between the wages of skilled and unskilled labour. Empirical evidences suggest that the relative wage inequality has worsened in many of the developing countries after trade liberalization which is contrary to the predictions of the standard Heckscher–Ohlin (HO) model with Stolper–Samuelson theorem at its core. This calls for theoretical explanations. This chapter is devoted to offer such explanations in terms of a few simple general equilibrium models taking adequately into consideration some of the salient features of these countries like labour market imperfections, rural urban migration and presence and type of non-traded goods.
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- 1.
Another important paper in this context is that of Chaudhuri and Banerjee (2010a, b). They have found that inflows of foreign capital unambiguously improve the economic conditions of the unskilled working class. However, the effects of FDI on skilled–unskilled wage inequality and extent of unemployment of both types of labour crucially hinge on the properties implied by the efficiency function of the skilled workers.
- 2.
This section draws upon excerpts of Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi (2007).
- 3.
It may be mentioned that besides primary agricultural commodities, India is also a large exporter of high-skill products like computer software.
- 4.
Assuming that each formal sector firm has a separate trade union, the unionized wage function may be derived as a solution to the Nash bargaining game between the representative firm and the representative labour union in the low-skill manufacturing sector. For detailed derivation, see Chaudhuri (2003) and Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2009).
- 5.
On one hand, the trade union requires a higher wage rate than the competitive one as usual, and on the other, the competitive wage rate itself rises as the union wage rate increases if the collective bargaining institutions exist and have some effects on the unskilled labour market. See Carruth and Oswald (1981) in this context. Besides, the informal sector is not generally a free-entry sector in the developing countries as it is thought to be. Several authors, including Banerjee (1986) in case of India and Gandhi-Kingdon and Knight (2001) in case of South Africa, have noted that many activities in the so-called informal sector of the developing countries are highly stratified, requiring skills, experience and contacts, with identifiable barriers to entry. Even when skill and capital are not required, entry can be difficult because of the presence of cohesive networks, which exercise control over location and zone of operation. Thus, various impediments to entry make the wage rate downwardly rigid in many cases. Also, in the case of agriculture, there are cases of downward wage rigidity that can be explained by the ‘collusive theory of unemployment’ (Osmani 1991). However, as a first step to address the role of trade unionism on wage inequality, we emphasize in this chapter the role of trade union in the formal sector only.
- 6.
It should be pointed out, in this context, that the channels through which unionization of the unskilled labour market affects the skilled–unskilled wage dispersion are far more complex (covering wages and benefits, work rules limiting the intensity of work, stabilizing hours, reducing arbitrariness in management actions, etc.) than has been worked out here. Although the unionized wage function used in the present analysis is simple in form and does not consider some of the complex issues relating to collective bargaining, it does have a strong micro-foundation based on Nash bargaining. Besides, the use of this function provides us a theory (though not derived here) of wage differential between the sectors and helps to derive some interesting results which are new in the literature on trade and development.
- 7.
- 8.
While examining the consequence of emigration of skilled and unskilled labour on the wage inequality in an otherwise 2 × 3 specific factor model of Jones (1971), Marjit and Kar (2005) have shown that with international factor flows, factor shares matter in determining the trend in wage distribution.
- 9.
Here sectors 2 and 3 use two different types of labour. However, there is one intersectorally mobile input which is capital. So, these two industries cannot be classified in terms of factor intensities that are usually used in the Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson model. Despite this, a special type of factor intensity classification in terms of the relative distributive shares of the mobile factor, capital, may be used for analytical purposes. The industry in which this share is higher relative to the other may be considered as capital-intensive in a special sense. See Jones and Neary (1984) for details.
- 10.
Note that (θ S2 θ K3 > θ K2 θ L3) implies (θ K3 > θ K2) and that the result in proposition 5.1 is valid even if (θ S2 θ K3 = θ K2 θ L3), i.e. (θ K3 = θ K2).
- 11.
For an analysis of the consequence of FDI on the relative wage inequality in the presence of both skilled and unskilled unemployment, see Chaudhuri and Banerjee (2010b). They have found that the effect of FDI on the skilled–unskilled wage inequality crucially hinges on the properties implied by the efficiency function of the skilled workers.
- 12.
This section draws upon Chaudhuri (2008).
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
It is assumed that the capital stock of the economy consists of both domestic and foreign capital that are perfect substitutes. This assumption has been widely used in the theoretical literature on trade and development.
- 16.
See footnote 4 in this context.
- 17.
The stipulated minimum wage is at least equal to the competitive rural sector wage. See Bhalotra (2002) in this context.
- 18.
W* is an endogenous variable only if it is a function of the rural unskilled wage, W, i.e. if α > 0. Otherwise, it is a parameter.
- 19.
The average wage of the workers (unskilled workers in this case) in an HT economy is equal to the rural sector wage. This is known as the ‘envelope property’.
- 20.
For detailed derivations, see Chaudhuri (2008).
- 21.
See footnote 9.
- 22.
For further details, see Chaudhuri (2008).
- 23.
- 24.
One should ideally make use of a four-sector general equilibrium for capturing simultaneously both non-traded goods and imperfections in the market for unskilled labour. These draw upon Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi (2008).
- 25.
- 26.
- 27.
Although the mobility of capital has increased considerably across countries owing to the liberalized investment policies, it is still far from being complete. In the developing countries like India, the FDI proposals are considered and approved on a case-to-case basis. Hence, due to incomplete and restricted mobility of capital, the world rate of return and the domestic rate of return to capital do not get equalized. We should note that if capital were perfectly mobile internationally, a large capital inflow would have brought down the domestic return to capital thereby raising the wage rates unambiguously.
- 28.
See footnote 25 in this context.
- 29.
It rules out the possibility of substitution between the non-traded input and other factors of production in sector 3. Although this is a simplifying assumption, it is not totally unrealistic. In industries like shoemaking and garments, large formal sector firms farm out their production to small informal sector firms under the system of subcontracting. So the production is done in the informal sector, while labelling, packaging and marketing are done by the formal sector firms. One pair of shoes produced in the informal sector does not change in quantity when it is marketed by the formal sector as a final commodity. Thus, there remains a fixed proportion between the use of the intermediate good and the quantity of the final commodity produced and marketed by the formal sector. On the other hand, if sector 2 produces an agricultural product like sugarcane or cotton, there might exist a fixed proportion between the quantity of input used and the quantity of output produced in the sugar mills/textile firms. It may be noted that Gupta (1994), Chaudhuri (2003), Chaudhuri et al. (2006), Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2009) and Marjit (2003) have also made this assumption for different purposes.
- 30.
It may be mentioned that besides primary agricultural commodities, India is also a large exporter of high-skill products like computer software. However, one may also consider alternative trade patterns as results of this paper do not depend on the pattern of trade of the economy.
- 31.
See footnote 4.
- 32.
One may alternatively consider α = (1 + α 0) where α 0 includes the institutional characteristics of the formal sector labour market.
- 33.
See Layard et al. (2005) for details.
- 34.
See Appendix 5.1 for detailed derivation of this expression.
- 35.
Note that S i jk is the degree of substitution between factors in the ith sector, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. For more details, see Chap. 2.
- 36.
See Appendix 5.1.
- 37.
The proportion of workforce engaged in unorganized sector in India in 1999–2000 was as high as 93.6 %. The corresponding figure for 2009–2010 was 91.2 %. See Papola and Sahu (2012), Table 19. The unorganized sector, commonly known as the informal sector, comprises mainly of unskilled workers. Hence, the percentage of workforce engaged in the formal sector in India has remained very small even after economic reforms.
- 38.
In Chap. 3, we have already discussed about agricultural dualism and the welfare consequence of FDI in the developing economies.
- 39.
D 2 depends on prices of the other commodities as well. But, we do not include other prices in the demand function as these are internationally given.
- 40.
- 41.
The stability condition has been derived in Appendix 5.5.
- 42.
- 43.
See Appendix 5.3.
- 44.
This has been shown in Appendix 5.4.
- 45.
These have already been discussed under (i) and (iii) above.
- 46.
The return to land-capital rises.
- 47.
This has been shown in Appendix 5.7.
- 48.
This is, of course, not a WTO-compliant policy. In fact, the developing countries have been advised to remove all tariffs, quotas, subsidies and other impediments to free trade so as to completely reap the benefits of economic reforms. However, in a developing country with high degree of income and wealth inequalities, the distributional and growth aspects are equally important for economic development. These economies, therefore, need not follow all the WTO recommendations so as to protect the interest of the poorer section of the working population.
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Appendices
Appendices
5.1.1 Appendix 5.1: Derivation of the Expression for Change in Relative Wage Inequality
Totally differentiating Eqs. (5.31), (5.32), (5.33.1), (5.34), (5.36), (5.37), (5.38), (5.39) and (5.40); keeping all parameters, except K, unchanged; and arranging in a matrix notation, one gets
where
The determinant to the coefficient matrix in (5.A.1) is given by
As commodity 2 is internationally non-traded, its market must clear domestically through adjustments in its price, P 2. The stability condition in the market for commodity 2 requires that
(d(X D2 − X 2)/dP 2) < 0. This implies around equilibrium, initially, X D2 = X 2. Thus, \( \left(\left({\widehat{X}}_2^D/{\widehat{P}}_2\right)-\left({\widehat{X}}_2/{\widehat{P}}_2\right)\right)<0 \). This requires that Δ > 0. In this case, of course, the stability condition is automatically satisfied. This is because from (5.A.2) and (5.A.3), it follows that ∆ is unconditionally positive.
Solving (5.A.1) by Cramer’s rule, the following expressions are obtained:
where \( {\tilde{\theta}}_{L3}=\left({\theta}_{L2}{\theta}_{23}+{\theta}_{L3}\right) \) and \( {\tilde{\theta}}_{K3}=\left({\theta}_{K2}{\theta}_{23}+{\theta}_{K3}\right) \). Differentiating (5.41), using (5.A.4), (5.A.6) and (5.A.7), and simplifying, one can derive the following expression:
Using (5.A.2) and (5.A.3) from (5.A.4), (5.A.5), (5.A.6), (5.A.7), (5.A.8) and (5.A.9), the following results are obtained.
When \( \widehat{K}>0 \), (1) \( \widehat{W}>0 \); (2) \( {\widehat{W}}_{\mathrm{S}}>0 \); (3) \( \widehat{r}<0 \); (4) \( {\widehat{X}}_3>0 \); (5) \( {\widehat{W}}_{\mathrm{A}}>0 \) if S 2 LK ≥ S 3 LK ; and (6) \( {\widehat{P}}_2>0 \) (as θ L2 θ K3 > θ L3 θ K2, i.e. sector 3 is more capital-intensive relative to sector 2 with respect to unskilled labour in value sense).
Subtracting (5.A.9) from (5.A.5), using (5.A.4) and after a little manipulation, one obtains the following expression:
5.1.2 Appendix 5.2: Derivations of Certain Useful Expressions
Total differentials of (5.44), (5.45), (5.46) and (5.47) holding the parameters unaffected yield the following expressions, respectively:
Using (5.54), Eq. (5.53) may be rewritten as follows:
Differentiating totally Eqs. (5.51), (5.52) and (5.A.14) and allowing only parameter K to change, one gets, respectively,
Also differentiating (5.49) and (5.50), one may obtain
where
Arranging (5.A.10), (5.A.11), (5.A.12), (5.A.13) and (5.A.15), (5.A.16), (5.A.17) and (5.A.18) in a matrix notation, we get the following:
where
So, we always have
Using the stability condition in the market for commodity 2 (see Appendix 5.5), it can be shown that Ω < 0.
5.1.3 Appendix 5.3: Effects on Factor and Non-traded Commodity Prices
Solving (5.A.20) by Cramer’s rule, the following expressions are obtained:
where
\( {\widehat{X}}_3 \) also can be solved in the same manner. The final expression for \( {\widehat{X}}_3 \) has been derived in Appendix 5.6. Using the stability condition in the market for commodity 2, it can be shown that \( {\widehat{X}}_3>0 \) when \( \widehat{K}>0 \).
From (5.A.25), (5.A.26), (5.A.27) and (5.A.28), the following results can be found:
-
1.
If sector 1 is more land-capital-intensive vis-à-vis sector 2 with respect to unskilled labour (i.e. |λ|, |λ * | > 0; |θ| < 0) when \( \widehat{K}>0 \), (i) \( \widehat{W}>0 \), (ii) \( {\widehat{W}}_S>0 \), (iii) \( \widehat{r}<0 \) and (iv) \( {\widehat{P}}_2>0 \).
-
2.
If sector 1 is more labour-intensive (but not sufficiently labour-intensive) than sector 2 (i.e. |λ| < 0; |λ * |, |θ| > 0) when \( \widehat{K}>0 \), (i) \( \widehat{W}>0 \), (ii) \( {\widehat{W}}_S>0 \), (iii) \( \widehat{r}<0 \) and (iv) \( {\widehat{P}}_2<0 \).
-
3.
If sector 1 is sufficiently labour-intensive (i.e. |λ|, |λ * | < 0; |θ| > 0) when \( \widehat{K}>0 \), (i) \( \widehat{W}<0 \), (ii) \( {\widehat{W}}_S<0 \), (iii) \( \widehat{r}>0 \) and (iv) \( {\widehat{P}}_2>0 \).
5.1.4 Appendix 5.4: Derivation of Expression for Relative Wage Inequality
Differentiating (5.41), one gets:
Using (5.A.25) and (5.A.27), the above expression may be simplified to
From (5.A.30), it is evident that:
-
1.
When \( \widehat{K}>0 \), \( {\widehat{W}}_A>0 \) if (i) (|λ| > 0 and λ L3 > 0 ⇒ |λ * | > 0)/(|λ| < 0 and λ L3 > 0 such that |λ * | > 0) and (ii) θ K3 ≥ S 3 LK . Note that when sector 2 (sector 1) is labour-intensive (land-capital-intensive) (i.e. |λ| > 0) and the proportion of unskilled labour employed in sector 3 (i.e. λ L3) is not sufficiently small, this allocative share rises following an inflow of foreign capital under the sufficient condition that θ K3 ≥ S 3 LK . The average unskilled wage, W A, also rises in this situation.
-
2.
When \( \widehat{K}>0 \), \( {\widehat{W}}_{\mathrm{A}}<0 \) if (i) |λ| < 0 and λ L3 ≅ 0 so that |λ * | < 0.
Subtracting (5.A.30) from (5.A.26), using (5.A.25) and (5.A.27) and simplifying, we get
Using (5.A.29), equation (5.A.31) can be rewritten as follows:
5.1.5 Appendix 5.5: Stability Condition of the Market for Commodity 2
As commodity 2 is internationally non-traded, its market must clear domestically through adjustments in its price, P 2. The stability condition of the market for commodity 2 requires that (d(D 2 − X 2)/dP 2) < 0. This implies around equilibrium, initially, D 2 = X 2. Thus,
Totally differentiating Eqs. (5.44), (5.45), (5.46) and (5.47) and solving, one can find out the following expressions:
Then differentiating Eqs. (5.51), (5.52), (5.53) and (5.54), using (5.A.33), (5.A.34), (5.A.35) and (5.A.36), putting \( \widehat{K}=0 \) and solving by Cramer’s rule, the following expressions may be obtained:
Differentiating Eqs. (5.48) and (5.49) and considering \( \widehat{K}=0 \), one can derive
Using (5.A.33), (5.A.34), (5.A.35), (5.A.36), (5.A.38), equation (5.A.39) may be rewritten as follows:
Substituting the expressions for \( \left({\widehat{D}}_2/{\widehat{P}}_2\right) \) and \( \left({\widehat{X}}_2/{\widehat{P}}_2\right) \) from (5.A.40) and (5.A.37) in (5.A.32) and simplifying, one obtains
Thus, the stability condition in the market for commodity 2 is given by (5.A.41).
Using (5.A.24) and (5.A.41) from (5.A.21), it now trivially follows that
5.1.6 Appendix 5.6: Effect on X 3
Solving (5.A.20), we can find the following expression:
It may be noted that
Inserting the values of B i s from (5.A.19), using (5.A.44) and simplifying, it is easily found that
Using (5.A.45) and simplifying, from (5.A.43), the following expression can be easily derived:
Using (5.A.19) and (5.A.41) and comparing terms, we can check that the algebraic sign of the square-bracketed term in (5.A.46) is positive. As Ω < 0, from (5.A.46), it now follows that \( {\widehat{X}}_3>0 \) when \( \widehat{K}>0 \).
5.1.7 Appendix 5.7: Effect on X 4
Differentiating Eq. (5.54), one gets
Inserting the values of \( {\widehat{W}}_S \) and \( \widehat{r} \) from (5.A.26) and (5.A.27) in (5.A.47) and simplifying, the following expression is finally obtained:
From (5.A.48), the following results can be stated:
-
1.
If sector 1 is land-capital-intensive or unskilled labour-intensive (but not sufficiently enough) (such that |λ* | > 0), \( {\widehat{X}}_4>0 \) when \( \widehat{K}>0 \).
-
2.
If sector 1 is sufficiently unskilled labour-intensive (such that |λ* | < 0), \( {\widehat{X}}_4<0 \) when \( \widehat{K}>0 \).
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Chaudhuri, S., Mukhopadhyay, U. (2014). FDI and Relative Wage Inequality. In: Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries. Springer, New Delhi. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-1898-2_5
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