Abstract
During the Great Depression of the 1930s, an event to which the recent crisis is often compared, the animosities of the interwar period prevented a coordinated policy response to what was essentially a global problem. Indeed, it is often argued that this failure resulted, inter alia, in the cascading competitive protectionism triggered by the Smoot–Hawley tariffs that may well have magnified a deep recession into the Great Depression. In sharp contradistinction, the G20 orchestrated a much acclaimed globally coordinated policy response to the Great Recession, in the process effectively putting in place a new institution to manage globalization.
With the prospects of the global recovery remaining uncertain, and with the IMF repeatedly downgrading its successive forecasts for global economic growth, the initial accolades received by the G20 for having forestalled a second Great Depression have yielded to questioning of the appropriateness of its policy response and its effectiveness as the premier forum for international economic co-operation.
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Notes
- 1.
While the fall in aggregate national income was not as rapid and been as sharp in major countries as during the Great Depression—except in the Eurozone periphery—in several other respects parallels are quite striking.
- 2.
See Table 1.
- 3.
The relative role of monetary and fiscal policy during the Great Depression is a matter of continuing debate. Rangarajan and Sheel (2013, p. 47).
- 4.
The Bank of Japan has however recently embarked on a much more aggressive round of quantitative easing, comparable to what the US Federal Reserve is doing, in an attempt to defeat deflation and raise growth.
- 5.
A comparative picture of the expansion of the balance sheets of the four major central banks, including their composition and source of financing, can be gleaned from IMF’s GFSR (2013b, p. 97).
- 6.
The Business Cycle Dating Committee, of the National Bureau of Economic Research, has determined that economic activity in the US peaked in December 2007, and “that the subsequent decline in economic activity was large enough to qualify as a recession.” Determination of December 2007 Peak in Economic Activity, National Bureau of Economic Research, http://www.nber.org/cycles/dec2008.html.
- 7.
In its World Economic Outlook of October 2008, the IMF was still forecasting global growth at 3 %, and that of advanced economies at 0.5 %, in 2009. This was subsequently revised downwards to 0.5 and − 2 % in its January 2009 Update , and further to − 1.3 and − 3.8 % in its World Economic Outlook of April 2009, around the time of the London (second) G20 Summit.
- 8.
Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, Washington DC, November 15, 2008. http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2008/2008declaration1115.html.
- 9.
Para 9: “ We noted that fiscal policies have served as an important instrument to address the current financial crisis, including through government support to the financial sector and have performed an important stabilization role and in mitigating further negative effects on markets and on economic activity. Some countries are also considering additional fiscal measures to stimulate the economy and we agreed that countries must use all their policy flexibility consistent with their circumstances, to support sustainable growth, while we recognize the importance of fiscal sustainability for macroeconomic stability and growth….” Communiqué. G20 Meeting of Ministers and Governors, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 8–9, November, 2008. http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2008/2008communique1109.pdf The International Monetary Fund was also of the view that “In Europe, with its relatively large automatic stabilizers, the additional fiscal impulse can probably be somewhat less than in the United States,” Blanchard (2008, p. 12).
- 10.
These differences were more clearly in evidence in the closed-door deliberations, than in the official Communiqués, from where these can be deduced by reading ‘between the lines’. Thus in the Horsham Communiqué, while paragraph 6 makes a strong statement on strengthening financial regulation, bullet # 3 clarifies that “it is vital that capital requirements remain unchanged until recovery is assured.” Paragraph 5 states that while “fiscal expansion is providing vital support for growth and jobs….we will ensure the restoration of growth and long-run fiscal sustainability.” Likewise paragraph 8 tried to limit the gains of the larger EMEs by protecting the share of the poorest developing economies. G20 Finance Ministers’ and Central Bank Governors’ Communiqué, March 14, 2009. http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0314.pdf.
- 11.
London Summit—Leaders’ Statement, 2 April 2009 , http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0402.pdf.
- 12.
Para 5 of the Pittsburgh Declaration consisted of just two words: “It worked.” IMF’s (20010) was appropriately entitled “A Policy-Driven, Multispeed Recovery.”
- 13.
Para 10: “We pledge today to sustain our strong policy response until a durable recovery is secured. We will act to ensure that when growth returns, jobs do too. We will avoid any premature withdrawal of stimulus. At the same time, we will prepare our exit strategies and, when the time is right, withdraw our extraordinary policy support in a cooperative and coordinated way, maintaining our commitment to fiscal responsibility.” Para 11: “Even as the work of recovery continues, we pledge to adopt the policies needed to lay the foundation for strong, sustained and balanced growth in the 21st century.” G20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, September 24–25, 2009, Pittsburgh. http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html.
- 14.
IMF’s official role in the G20 Framework exercise is to act as ‘technical advisor’.
- 15.
The G20 Toronto Summit Declaration, Toronto, June 27, 2010. http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/to-communique.html.
- 16.
Ibid.
- 17.
The G20 Study Group set up to study the issue however did not come up with conclusive evidence of this, pointing instead to the steep rise in physical demand for commodities in recent times, especially in emerging markets. These conclusions were keenly debated in G20 meetings, especially since there was continued pressure on commodity prices despite a collapse in global demand. Report of the G20 Study Group on Commodities under the chairmanship of Mr. Hiroshi Nakaso, November 2011 http://www.cmegroup.com/education/files/G20Nakaso-November202011.pdf.
- 18.
These developing country concerns were carried forward into subsequent Summits leading to a debate within the G20 on external spillovers of monetary policies in reserve currency issuing countries which basically respond to domestic business cycles. At the next Summit at Cannes, G20 Leaders agreed to G20 Coherent Conclusions for the Management of Capital Flows Drawing on Country Experiences (http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-finance-capital-flows-111015-en.pdf) that were earlier endorsed by G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors on October 15, 2011. While there were several constructive ambiguities in this agreement, reflecting sharp differences between G20 countries on the issue, this nevertheless endorsed the view that as a last resort countries could put in place ‘capital flow management’ measures to insulate them from the volatility in cross-border capital flows inherent in the shifting monetary policy stance in reserve issuing currencies. The real significance of this agreement was that it pressured the IMF into abandoning its long-held view that the final objective of all countries should be to move towards full convertibility on the capital account. While re-iterating the benefit of capital flows, the IMF now concluded that there was “no presumption that full liberalization is an appropriate goal for all countries at all times” IMF (2012c) .
- 19.
The G20 Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration, Seoul, November 12, 2010. http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul.html.
- 20.
In its World Economic Outlook of September 2011 the IMF observed that “While imbalances decreased during the crisis, this was due more to a large decrease in output in advanced relative to emerging market economies than to structural adjustment in these economies. Looking forward, the forecast is for an increase rather than a decrease in imbalances.” Its tune had changed, however, by the time of its next World Economic Outlook in April 2012, where it stated that “latest developments suggest that global current account imbalances are no longer expected to widen again, following their sharp reduction during the Great Recession.”, and by July 2012, in its Staff Report for the Article IV Consultations with China it assessed the Chinese currency as only “moderately undervalued.” IMF (2012d). .
- 21.
WTO (2011). If the same exchange rate that led to rising trade surpluses with the US—and could therefore considered undervalued—also led to rising trade deficits with East Asia, what, then, was the equilibrium exchange rate?
- 22.
Cannes Summit Final Declaration—Building Our Common Future: Renewed Collective Action for the Benefit of All Cannes, November 4, 2011. http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-declaration-111104-en.html.
- 23.
The G20 had for long talked about global rebalancing, but the Los Cabos Action Plan was the first G20 document that acknowledged the need for internal rebalancing in the Eurozone. Also, while no specific commitments were given, pointers to the banking union, the severance of the negative “feedback loop between sovereigns and banks” and measures to support growth agreed at the EU Summit 10 days later were all there in the Los Cabos Leaders’ Declaration and Action Plan. It is true that nothing definitive was stated about fiscal union or the conversion of the European Central Bank into a regular central bank that can insulate sovereign bonds from market revolt. But there was no consensus amongst European leaders themselves on these issues. G20 commitments, it must be remembered, are country led. G20 Leaders Declaration, Los Cabos, Mexico, June 19, 2012. http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2012/2012-0619-loscabos.html.
- 24.
While the Los Cabos Leaders’ Declaration exhorted countries with fiscal space to continue with stimulus in general terms, the country-specific linkage between fiscal space and stimulus that featured prominently in the Cannes Action Plan was dropped in the Los Cabos Action Plan. This severance allowed the USA, which was not included in the group of countries with fiscal space at Cannes, and now faced a “fiscal cliff” deriving from the double whammy of automatic federal expenditure cuts and expiry of tax cuts, to commit to continuing stimulus at Los Cabos.
- 25.
G20 Leaders’ Declaration, St. Petersburg, September 6, 2013.http://www.g20utoronto.ca/summits/2013stpetersburg.html
- 26.
Brad DeLong and Lawrence Summers recently argued that when economic activity is depressed, and monetary policy is zero bound, fiscal multipliers should be larger than usual. DeLong and Summers (2012). The IMF came to a similar conclusion in its findings that fiscal multipliers were higher in the early phase of the crisis, although they tended to decline over time. Blanchard and Leigh (2013).
- 27.
A fuller discussion on the issues relating to infrastructure and the recovery can be seen in C. Rangarajan and Alok Sheel, Growth or Austerity, op. cit. pp. 77–81.
- 28.
Barring periodic quarterly recoveries that have proved to be false dawns each time, as they indeed did during the long Great Depression of the 1930s. The recent rebound in US housing prices, which is widely expected to drive the recovery of consumer demand in the USA, should be read with the sobering data that shows that the housing mortgage market is now entirely dependent on state support through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that are now guaranteeing about 90 % of all residential mortgages, and even these are being ultimately bought by the US Federal Reserve. Tett (2013).
- 29.
It is moot whether it was the sharp divide in policy, or bond market revolt, that originally pushed peripheral European countries towards austerity. Altman (2013). Be it as it may, the USA (fiscal stimulus) and Germany (austerity) in particular have clashed lately on the issue in international forums such as the IMF, G20 and G7. UK’s about-turn from stimulus to austerity was also a conscious policy decision rather than induced by bond markets.
- 30.
The Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman has from the very beginning been a consistent votary of this point of view, arguing that fiscal stimulus in the US was ineffective because it was too small. Krugman has written prolifically on the subject over the years. The main arguments are summarized in a recent piece, viz. Krugman (2013). Lawrence Summers, former US Treasury Secretary is of a similar view. Summers (2013). Martin Wolf, chief economics commentator of the Financial Times is another high profile protagonist of the stimulus and growth camp. Wolf (2013a). It would appear that the IMF itself holds this view. Cottarelli and Jaramillo (2012); Eyraud and Weber (2013); IMF (2013c).
- 31.
The Bank of International Settlements, which has underscored that extended stimulus is only delaying the structural reforms that alone can drive a sustainable recovery, also appears to fall into this camp. The BIS view differs significantly from that of the IMF, which is clearly on the side of extended stimulus. Bank for International Settlements (2013). There are clear indications that after its disastrous brush with austerity, the European Union may be heading in this direction. The European Commission has recently decided to permit France, Spain and the Netherlands to breach the 3 % budget deficit cap for a short period provided they undertake far-reaching labour reforms. Spiegel and Daneshkhu (2013). These countries, however, still have market access to finance deficits. The big challenge in the Eurozone is on how to finance stimulus in countries such as Greece and Portugal that have effectively lost market access.
- 32.
While initially it seemed that the unwinding was mostly cyclical, it now appears likely that it has large structural components as well on account of the rise in US savings and China’s new focus on domestic demand reflected in its 12th Five Year Plan.
- 33.
Peripheral Europe is of course the exception. But this is because sovereign debt in the Eurozone does not have the central bank backstop.
- 34.
In its October 2012 World Economic Outlook the IMF concluded that “consistent with research suggesting that in today’s environment of substantial economic slack, monetary policy constrained by the zero lower bound, and synchronized fiscal adjustment across numerous economies, multipliers may be well above 1”, IMF, WEO, October 2012, Chap. 1, Box 1.1, pp. 41–43.
- 35.
According to one estimate, $ 1 increase in investment in developing countries is likely to cause a $ 0.35 increase in capital goods exports from high-income countries. Lin (2013).
- 36.
Practically each G20 Leaders’ Communique resolved to take the Doha Round to a speedy but balanced conclusion, even setting timelines for achieving this objective. Leaders were perhaps too optimistic regarding the possibilities of trade liberalization during a steep recession when the natural instinct is to close markets.
- 37.
WTO, OECD and UNCTAD (2012). While a large number of minor trade restrictive measures have accumulated over time, in the aggregate, they affect only about 3.5 % of world imports and 4.4 % of G20 imports. http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/8thG20report.pdf As a result, but for a slight dip during the deep recession in 2009 and early 2010, the ratio of global exports to global GDP (measured at market exchange rates), which had risen sharply during the preceding boom, did not decline.
Year
1995–2004
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Exports/GDP
23.7 %
24.7 %
24.0 %
24.3 %
25.1 %
27.1 %
28.4 %
30.2 %
31.1 %
32.4 %
27.4 %
29.8 %
31.7 %
31.3 %
31.7 %
IMF WEO
October 2008 & April 2013
Year
1995–2004
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Exports/GDP
23.7 %
24.7 %
24.0 %
24.3 %
25.1 %
27.1 %
28.4 %
30.2 %
31.1 %
32.4 %
27.4 %
29.8 %
31.7 %
31.3 %
31.7 %
IMF WEO
October 2008 & April 2013
- 38.
See footnote 24.
- 39.
An important caveat to WTO’s measurement of protectionism is that several new measures are not included in their inventory, such as fiscal stimulus that differentiates between domestic and foreign or non-resident investors, local production requirements, visas and residence permits, financial support to domestic companies and central bank measures to enhance the functioning of credit markets and the financial system that influence international capital movements in complex ways. Reports on G20 Trade and Investment Measures, op. cit. p. 57. See also Evenett (2013).
- 40.
Even Ben Bernanke, the driving force behind the creation of this liquidity, has warned that reckless speculation and search for yields in a low interest rate environment could inflate new asset bubbles. Harding et al. (2013). The Dow Jones has risen almost continuously over the past few years, scaling new highs, despite practically everybody being consistently downbeat on the prospects of global growth going forward. Junk bond yields are now where US Treasuries used to be in 2007. There is also a surge of ‘low quality’ capital flows to emerging markets strongly suggesting that push, rather than pull, factors are the driving force. “In the four years leading up to the Lehman Crisis in 2007 (2004–07), cumulative capital flows into EM totaled some USD3.1 trillion. This amount was substantially higher than the cumulative total of USD800 billion registered during the prior four years, 2000–2003. During the GFC (Global Financial Crisis), capital flows heading to EM collapsed, though they did not turn negative…. In the four years since the GFC (2009–2012), the cumulative capital flows into EM totalled USD3.9 trillion—even larger than the four years leading up to the GFC.” Jen and Dreisin (2013).
- 41.
Private non-financial sector debt as a proportion of the GDP in the USA, which increased sharply during the boom preceding the credit crunch, has been declining since and is now consistent with its long-term growth trajectory. See Bank for International Settlements, 83rd Annual Report, op. cit. Graph II.8, p. 23.
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Sheel, A. (2014). The Macroeconomic Policy Response to the International Financial and Economic Crisis and the G20. In: Callaghan, M., Ghate, C., Pickford, S., Rathinam, F. (eds) Global Cooperation Among G20 Countries. Springer, New Delhi. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-1659-9_21
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