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The Self as Organizer

  • Rajesh Kasturirangan
Chapter

Abstract

We experience the world as a coherent, complete and seamless whole, despite the impoverished character of our representations of the world. Vision scientists study our perception of a stable three-dimensional world in the presence of fleeting two-dimensional stimuli; I believe that the problem of coherence and stability extends far beyond the domain of vision to the study of the mind as a whole. This chapter is an exploration of the “whole world” experience through the lens of cognitive science; I claim that neither traditional computational approaches nor the more recent embodied approaches to the mind account for the wholeness of the world. Instead, I argue that the whole world experience points to the existence of the self as an organizer that structures experience and makes it whole. If so, the self has a much larger role to play in the mind sciences than is currently acknowledged, and the study of the self is a bridge between traditional concerns of metaphysics and the modern cognitive sciences.

Keywords

Cognitive Scientist Direct Perception Inattentional Blindness Perceptual Knowledge Plausibility Argument 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer India 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of HumanitiesNational Institute of Advanced StudiesBangaloreIndia

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