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The Feel Factor: Qualia and the Affective Markers of Experience

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Book cover Brain, Self and Consciousness

Part of the book series: Studies in Neuroscience, Consciousness and Spirituality ((SNCS,volume 3))

Abstract

This chapter discusses emotions as the affective markers of experience. The bridge for social interactions is built by emotions which play the role of narrators of physical, mental, and social health for oneself and for others. When from one point of view emotions guide neural mechanisms for physiological and chemical balance, from another viewpoint emotion enhances self-expression and the presentation of the person. The study of emotion bring in the role of the brain, the body, and the self, interspersed by the influence of environment, society, art, and one’s character. In this chapter that focus on emotions I discuss the following questions: Why and for what outcome does the brain generate emotions? How are feelings and emotions different? Are feelings always dependent on sensations? Are there feelings that are not dependent on sensations? Can feelings be considered as discrete cognitive events and understood within the framework of neuroscience? Another pertinent issue that is discussed currently is the ability of emotions to be part of a decision-making process by contributing to the cognitive deciders. Do emotions influence our cognitive capacities and rational processes?

What is it that makes us human? It’s not something you can program. You can’t put it into a chip. It’s the strength of the human heart. The difference between us and the machines.

—From ‘Terminator Salvation’

As Marcus gives his heart to John Connor

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See PHYSORG.com; http://www.physorg.com/news175417796.html; accessed on 8 June 2011.

  2. 2.

    The ‘Mary’s knowledge’ argument is a thought experiment that refutes physicalism, and states that in spite of the availability of all the objective physical facts of colour vision, the scientist Mary did not know what it was to experience colour vision until she moved to the real world from the confinement of a black-and-white room.

  3. 3.

    Nagel argues in this famous paper that subjective quality is central to consciousness.

  4. 4.

    The word ‘anesthesia’ means ‘no sensation’. ‘Synesthesia’ means ‘joined sensation’ (Greek, syn = together; aisthesis = perception). Synesthesia may also be induced by sensory deprivation, hallucinogens such as LSD and peyote, or direct electrical stimulation of subcortical limbic structures.

  5. 5.

    Phineas Gage (1823–1860) is one of the earliest documented cases of severe brain injury which led to significant findings. An accident destroyed areas of his prefrontal lobe, and consequentially led to loss of his emotional and social capacities. His rational capabilities were intact to some extent. The damage interfered with Gage’s capacity for planning and deciding a course of action. Damasio also narrates the case of Elliot who had a medical condition that affected the frontal lobe. He suffered from poor judgement and lack of insight, though he excelled in IQ tests. Patients like Gage and Elliot, though they perform well in cognitive and intelligence tests, show marked deficits in decision-making in everyday life.

  6. 6.

    See: Zajonc, R. B. (1985, April 5) Emotion and facial efference: a theory reclaimed. Science, 228(4695): 15–21.

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  1. Consciousness Studies Programme School of Humanities, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Indian Institute of Science Campus, Bangalore, Karnataka, 560012, India

    Sangeetha Menon

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Menon, S. (2014). The Feel Factor: Qualia and the Affective Markers of Experience. In: Brain, Self and Consciousness. Studies in Neuroscience, Consciousness and Spirituality, vol 3. Springer, New Delhi. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-1581-3_7

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