Abstract
In this chapter a fundamental question is explored, namely: ‘is my inner awareness of my-self separate from my body?’ Is my body-sense separate from my self-sense? What are body-sense and self-sense? Are the self-sense and the body-sense distinct senses? A dominant approach inspired by Aristotelian thinking is that the self-sense is the body-sense. Who I am is closely tied to my embodied existence. I cannot sense my-self without the accompanying body-sense. Subjectivity is inherent in the body-sense. The body-sense extends beyond the physical limits of the body as evidenced by the body maps in the brain. Body becomes more than the biological body by including its psychological, social, and cultural extensions. Such a scenario brings in the need to distinguish between a minimal functional self and the self that is continuous over a period of time. The thesis that this chapter presents is that the self-sense comes to us not as a neutral and bland self but as a rich whole permeating the entire being at the very first moment itself. We might conceptually get rid of a rich whole, organic, self-sense. But can we do away with such a ‘self-sense’ experientially? The fourth chapter makes a proposal that the organic core-self is the innermost self.
Consciousness is the appearance of a world
—Metzinger, 2009
World is the appearance of consciousness
—Sankaracharya, circa 8 c. CE
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Notes
- 1.
For a related discussion, see Zarrilli (2000), who writes about the acutely sensitive body of a master of Kalaripayattu, the ancient martial art from Kerala the southern state of India.
- 2.
The rubber hand illusion is an experimental illusion examined by Botvinick and Cohen to demonstrate that there is a three-way interaction between vision, touch and proprioception, and that it may supply evidence concerning the basis of bodily self-identification. See (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998, p. 756).
- 3.
tatha hi madhure gite sparse va chandanadike madhyathi avagameya sauhrdaye spandanamanata anandasaktih saivoktayatah sahrdayoh janah (Abhinavagupta, Tantraloka 3:200).
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Menon, S. (2014). Body-Sense and Self-Sense: Why is Minimalism Insufficient?. In: Brain, Self and Consciousness. Studies in Neuroscience, Consciousness and Spirituality, vol 3. Springer, New Delhi. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-1581-3_5
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