Safeguards and Investigations

  • Mostafa Beshkar
  • Eric W. Bond


We characterize the optimal safeguard policy for a small country under two types of safeguard mechanisms: one in which tariff changes are triggered by changes in import prices or import volumes and one in which an investigation is required to obtain increased protection. We assume the government uses a weighted social welfare function to evaluate policies, and that an investigation represents the use of resources to reveal the value of private information regarding income of producers. The safeguards we consider correspond to the WTO's special safeguard mechanism for agricultural and the WTO's safeguard agreement, respectively.


Private Information Marginal Utility Social Welfare Function Import Price World Price 
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Copyright information

© Springer India 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of New HampshireDurhamUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsVanderbilt UniversityNashvilleUSA

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