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Sustainable Poverty Reduction: Credit for the Poor

  • Asis Kumar Banerjee
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter is a review of the research done over the past two decades or so on the role of credit supply in sustainable poverty reduction. Naturally, it is credit to the poor that will be the focus of our attention. We shall review both theoretical and empirical research. We shall also suggest possible lines of further research (which do not find mention in other reviews) and make a few policy recommendations (which, again, do not seem to appear in the existing literature) with reference to the Indian economy.

Keywords

Moral Hazard Adverse Selection Credit Market Informational Asymmetry Microfinance Institution 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer India 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Development Studies KolkataKolkataIndia

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