Abstract
In their quest to gain the favor of the electorate, politicians in general and Indian politicians in particular are known to roll out populist measures such as loan waivers, interest rate concessions, and provision of free electricity for agriculturists immediately prior to polls. With a view to establishing the relationship between the power to administer, control and micromanage prices, and the consequent electoral outcomes, this chapter studies the evolution in the retail prices of diesel and petrol (gasoline) administered by the Indian federal (central) government. It is observed that the transfer of changes in the prices of petroleum distillates to other commodities of common consumption takes approximately 42 weeks. The study, covering a total of 44 elections for the central and state (provincial) governments during the period 2000–2007, concludes that even as patterns of price manipulation immediately prior to elections and immediately thereafter are apparent, the leverage available to manipulate prices does not seem to translate into favorable electoral outcomes. This conclusion reiterates observations that economic performance does not necessarily determine electoral outcomes in India, and possibly other jurisdictions, and that the basis for electoral choices made by the Indian voter-consumers remains unclear.
Politicians are the same all over. They promise to build a bridge even where there is no river.
Nikita Khrushchev
Soviet Russian politician (1894–1971)
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Notes
- 1.
An earlier version of this article is at an advanced stage of review for publication with a reputed journal.
- 2.
See for instance, DiCecio (2006).
- 3.
- 4.
http://eaindustry.nic.in/; Economic Advisor to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
Incumbents prefer to keep prices stable or reduce prices prior to elections. However, the “model code of conduct” formulated by the Election Commission of India prohibits such actions after notification of the election, as they could possibly influence voters to favor the party in power.
- 8.
Evidently, smaller political parties could form part of the coalition and yet not subscribe to all the populist decisions taken: Worse some parties could offer “support from the outside” which the voters have tended to interpret as being opportunistic and attempting to have the power without owning up to the responsibility. As price manipulation is the ruling coalition’s decision, in the present instance, the coalition is viewed as a single block, with all constituents working in unison and involved in fuel price-related decisions, irrespective of their independent ideological posturing. Similarly, political parties outside or the ruling coalition are presumed to have no role to play in such pricing decisions.
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Sunderasan, S. (2013). The Irrelevance of Political Populism. In: Enabling Environment. Springer, India. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-0882-2_2
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