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Missile and Nuclear Conundrums

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Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?

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Abstract

Rocket technology is likewise for both civilian and military applications. There are certain fundamental differences in regard to technology appreciation between space launch rockets and ballistic missiles. However, the similarity in basic science and technology makes it impossible to separate them completely or permanently. Scientists in various parts of the world (mainly Germany, erstwhile USSR, the USA and few European Nations) during the early 1920s and 1930s were attracted to the rocket development because of their interests in idea of space travel. In order to continue to develop these ideas, the scientific community engaged military sponsors in those periods.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This argument is based on Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation the Politics and Technics, Sipri, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 52–56.

  2. 2.

    As per international estimates, North Korea could have exploded a half kiloton device (Hiroshima was 12 kiloton). This test is regarded as a partial failure.

  3. 3.

    http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09STATE98749, accessed on May 22, 2011.

  4. 4.

    http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/icoc, accessed on Jun 12, 2011.

  5. 5.

    Asia Report N°168, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear And Missile Programs’, 18 June 2009, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/north-korea/168-north-koreas-nuclear-and-missile-programs.aspx, accessed on July 30, 2011.

  6. 6.

    ‘U.S. officials: North Korea tests long-range missile’

    July 04, 2006, http://articles.cnn.com/2006-07-04/world/korea.missile_1_long-range-missile-long-range-test-taepodong-1?_s=PM:WORLD, accessed Feb 12, 2011.

  7. 7.

    Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 50, ed. Duncan Lennox, (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, January 2009), 102–103 as mentioned in http://www.missilethreat.com/missilesoftheworld/id.166/missile_detail.asp, accessed Feb 12, 2011.

  8. 8.

    Asia Report N°168, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear And Missile Programs’, 18 June 2009, p.25, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/north-korea/168-north-koreas-nuclear-and-missile-programs.aspx, accessed on July 30, 2011.

  9. 9.

    The six-party talks began as an aftermath of North Korean nuclear programme in 2003. The states involved are both the Koreas, China, Japan, the USA and Russia.

  10. 10.

    For a detail study for the Iran’s Safir rocket please refer Rajaram Nagappa et al., Iran’s Safir launch Vehicle, NIAS Study 2009, NIAS Pulbication, Bangalore, 2009.

  11. 11.

    The Shahab 3 is a medium-range, liquid-propellant ballistic missile. Ghadr-1 is believed to be a more accurate version of Shahab 3. Iran has developed a number of variants to the original Shahab 3 missile. These have been referred to by various intelligence and media sources as the Shahab 3A, Shahab 3B, Shahab 3D, Shahab 3 M, Ghadr-1, and Qadr-1. The Shahab 3 has also been used as the basis for an Iranian space program, and these rockets have been called Kavoshgar-1, IRIS, and Safir. Please refer http://www.missilethreat.com/missilesoftheworld/id.190/missile_detail.asp, accessed on Aug 1, 2011.

  12. 12.

    http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Iran_successfully_launches_satellite_into_space_Al-Alam_TV_999.html, accessed Jul 17, 2011.

  13. 13.

    The regime comprises ‘Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers’ and an annex of controlled equipment and technologies. The annex of controlled equipment and technology is divided into ‘Category I’ and ‘Category II’ items. It includes equipment and technology, both military and dual-use, that are relevant to missile development, production and operation. According to the Guidelines, export of Category I items is subject to a presumption of denial. Category I includes complete rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles and sounding rockets); unmanned air-vehicle systems such as cruise missiles, target and reconnaissance drones; specially designed production facilities for these systems; and certain complete subsystems such as rocket engines or stages, re-entry vehicles, guidance sets, thrust-vector controls and warhead safing, arming, fuzing and firing mechanisms. The transfer of Category I production equipment will not be authorised. Please refer http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/missiles/mtcr.html, accessed on Aug 4, 2011.

  14. 14.

    The theoretical meaning of the word gimbal is the pivoted support that allows the rotation of an object about a single axis. In rocket science, this term is used to describe the swinging movement of a rocket engine.

  15. 15.

    http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09STATE98749, accessed on Jun 15, 2011.

  16. 16.

    http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm, accessed on Jun 26, 2011.

  17. 17.

    http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Israel/Missile/index.html, accessed on Jul 24, 2011.

  18. 18.

    Re-entry phase is a portion of the trajectory of a ballistic missile or space vehicle where there is a significant interaction of the vehicle and the Earth’s atmosphere.

  19. 19.

    Intercept of incoming missile can take place either inside (endoatmospheric) or outside (exoatmospheric) the Earth’s atmosphere. The trajectory of most ballistic missiles travels both the regions—inside as well as outside the Earth’s atmosphere. The engagement with the target can take place in either of these regions, and they can be intercepted either place.

  20. 20.

    Over the years, they have tested various technologies associated with this system. In spite of many years of research and development, missile defence is yet to emerge as a fully successful and functional system. However, the system is operational in parts, and the ground-based interceptors have been deployed since 2004.

  21. 21.

    Theresa Hitchens, ‘US Space Policy: Time to Stop and Think’, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 67, Oct-Nov 2002. For more information, please refer Lt Col Lorinda A. Frederick, ‘Deterrence and Space-Based Missile Defence’ Air and Space Power Journal, Fall 2009.

  22. 22.

    http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/israel-successfully-tests-arrow-theater-missile-defense-01571/

  23. 23.

    http://intelligencesinfo.wordpress.com/2011/03/31/indian-pursuit-of-ballistic-missile-defence-program-\%E2\%80\%93-analysis/, accessed on July 16, 2011.

  24. 24.

    ‘Chinese missile defence’, The Economist, Jan 14, 2010.

  25. 25.

    http://www.defence.pk/forums/wmd-missiles/24457-pakistan-may-seek-chinese-interceptor-missile-defense-2012-a.html, accessed on July 23, 2011.

  26. 26.

    Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Dec 19, 2003, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2003/1219danwa_e.html, accessed on May 15, 2011.

  27. 27.

    The discussion in first two paragraphs of this section is based on Ajey Lele, ‘India Investing in MIRV Technology’, Oct 22, 2009, http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/india-investing-in-mirv-technology-2987.html, accessed on Jul 30, 2011.

  28. 28.

    Bill Gertz, Betrayal, Washington DC: Regnery Publishers, 1999, p.251–254 as quoted in http://www.nti.org/db/china/wwhmdat.htm

  29. 29.

    ‘India’s latest strategic weapon’, The Hindu, May 8, 2008.

  30. 30.

    http://www.space-travel.com/reports/PSLV_Launches_Ten_Satellites_999.html, accessed on Mar 12, 2011.

  31. 31.

    http://www.jaxa.jp/projects/rockets/h2/index_e.html, accessed Mar 08, 2011.

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  1. Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, Rao Tula Ram Marg, New Delhi, India

    Ajey Lele

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Lele, A. (2013). Missile and Nuclear Conundrums. In: Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?. Springer, India. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7_10

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