Missile and Nuclear Conundrums

  • Ajey Lele


Rocket technology is likewise for both civilian and military applications. There are certain fundamental differences in regard to technology appreciation between space launch rockets and ballistic missiles. However, the similarity in basic science and technology makes it impossible to separate them completely or permanently. Scientists in various parts of the world (mainly Germany, erstwhile USSR, the USA and few European Nations) during the early 1920s and 1930s were attracted to the rocket development because of their interests in idea of space travel. In order to continue to develop these ideas, the scientific community engaged military sponsors in those periods.


Nuclear Weapon Launch Vehicle Ballistic Missile Satellite Launch Missile Defence 
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Copyright information

© Springer India 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ajey Lele
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute for Defence Studies & AnalysesNew DelhiIndia

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