Abstract
The concept of the evolution of organisms is indisputable. All organisms, including humans, are products of evolution. Humans are related to other primates and have evolved from earlier hominid species over the past five to seven million years. Therefore, we can postulate that our minds are part of a wider evolutionary pattern discernible from the minds of nonhuman animals. Many psychologists acknowledge the fact that modern evolutionary theory is useful in explaining human behavior and cognition. However, (2001) claimed that this theory has certain shortcomings from the developmental perspective. They pointed out three reasons for this.
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Itakura, S. (2008). Emergence of the Social Mind: Two Perspectives. In: Itakura, S., Fujita, K. (eds) Origins of the Social Mind. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-75179-3_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-75179-3_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Tokyo
Print ISBN: 978-4-431-75178-6
Online ISBN: 978-4-431-75179-3
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