Abstract
The paper presents a comparative analysis of the peculiar institutions of two retail markets: the middle-eastern Bazaar and the western Mall. We study the informational functions of the different markets using an Agent Based Computational Economics model under the assumption of behavioral learning by agents. Agents behave within the specific market to carry out their economic transactions, but institutions, as mechanisms to coordinate information, are expected to affect the price dynamics. The main research question concerns whether the presumed economic underperformance of Bazaar respect to more competitive markets holds true or it is necessary a reassessment on it.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Jennifer Alexander and Paul Alexander. Striking a bargain in Javanese markets. Man, New Series, 22(l):42–68, 1987.
M. Aoki. Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis. MIT Press, 2001.
W. B. Arthur, S. Durlauf, and D. Lane. The Economy as an Evolving Complex System II. Addison-Wesley, 1997.
Thomas Brenner. A behavioural learning approach to the dynamics of prices. Computational Economics, 19(l):67–94, 2002.
R. Cassady. Negotiated price making in mexican traditional markets: a conceptual analysis. America Indigena, 28:51–79, 1968.
J. G. Cross. The Economics of Bargaining. Basic Books, New York, 1969.
Frank S. Fanselow. The bazaar economy or how bizarre is the bazaar really? Man, New Series, 25(2):250–265, 1990.
Clifford Geertz. The bazaar economy: Information and search in peasant marketing. American Economic Review, 68(2):28–32, 1978.
Clifford Geertz. Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society, chapter Suq: The Bazaar Economy in Sefrou, pages 123–313. Cambridge University Press, 1979.
N. Gilbert and P. Terna. How to build and use agent-based models in social science. Mind & Society, pages 57–72, 2000.
F. A. Hayek. The use of knowledge in society. The American Economic Review, 35(4):519–530, 1945.
A. O. Hirschmann. Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations and state. Harvard University Press, 1970.
Fuad I. Khuri. The etiquette of bargaining in the middle east. American Anthropologist, 70(4):698–706, 1968.
Alan P. Kirman and Nicolaas J. Vriend. Evolving market structure: An ace model of price dispersion and loyalty. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 25(3-4):459–502, 2001.
Rachel E Kranton. Reciprocal exchange: A self-sustaining system. American Economic Review, 86(4):830–851, September 1996.
S. Moulet and J. Rouchier. The influence of sellers’ beliefs and time constraint on a sequential bargaining in an artificial perishable goods market. Technical report, GREQAM, Working Papers Series, 2006.
Douglass C. North. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Michael Rothschild. Searching for the lowest price when the distribution of prices is unknown. Journal of Political Economy, 82(4):689–711, 1974.
G. J. Stigler. The economics of information. The Journal of Political Economy 69(3):213–225, 1961.
L. Tesfatsion. Agent-based computational economics: Growing economies from the bottom up. ISU Economics Working Paper, 8(1), 2002.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2007 Springer
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Bertacchini, E.E., Lamieri, M. (2007). What if Hayek Goes Shopping in the Bazaar?. In: Takahashi, S., Sallach, D., Rouchier, J. (eds) Advancing Social Simulation: The First World Congress. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-73167-2_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-73167-2_14
Publisher Name: Springer, Tokyo
Print ISBN: 978-4-431-73150-4
Online ISBN: 978-4-431-73167-2
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)