A Role of Micro-macro Loop for Knowledge Creation by Heterogeneous Agents

Conference paper


In this paper, the problem of knowledge sharing of self-interested agents with heterogeneous knowledge is formulated as knowledge trading games. Agents are heterogeneous and they have different value judgment. We aggregate their idiosyncratic value judgment with threshold, and characterize agents by their thresholds. We study repeated knowledge transaction by focusing on the micro-macro loop between individual knowledge and common knowledge. We show the knowledge accumulation process by changing the initial levels of both private and common knowledge. Knowledge sharing is important process of creating new knowledge. We show that re-combination ability is most important to create new knowledge.


knowledge sharing knowledge accumulation threshold re-combination ability 


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. Campbell D (1955) Incentives, Cambridge University PressGoogle Scholar
  2. Carley K, Prietula M (1994) Computational Organization Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum AssciatesGoogle Scholar
  3. Carlsson H, Damme E (1993) Golbal Games and Equilibrium Selection. In: Econometrica 61:989–1018MathSciNetzbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Cohendet P (1998) The Economic of Networks, SpringerGoogle Scholar
  5. Cowan R, Jonard N (2001) Knowledge Creation, Knowledge Diffusion and Network Structure. In: Economics with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents. A. Kirman, J.-B. Zimmermann (Eds.) SpringerGoogle Scholar
  6. Cowan R, Jonard N, Zimmermann J (2002) On the Creation of Networks and Knowledge programme.html
  7. Friedman D (1991) Evolutionary Games in Economics. In: Econometrica 59:637–666MathSciNetzbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Fudenberg D, Levine D (1998) The theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. The MIT PressGoogle Scholar
  9. Fudenberg D, Tivole J (1991) Game Theory. The MIT PressGoogle Scholar
  10. Harsanyi J, Selten R (1988) A Game Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. The MIT PressGoogle Scholar
  11. Hofbauer J, K Sibmund (1988) Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge University PressGoogle Scholar
  12. Kaniovski Y, Kryazhimskii A, Young H (2000) Adaptive Dynamics in Games Played by Heterogeous Populations. In: Games and Economics behavior 31:50–96MathSciNetzbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Nonaka I, Takeuchi T (1995) The Knowledge-Creating Company. Oxford University PressGoogle Scholar
  14. Samuelson L (1998) Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection. The MIT PressGoogle Scholar
  15. Weibull J (1996) Evolutionary Game Theory. The MIT PressGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Japan 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.National Defense Academy Dept. of Computer ScienceJapan

Personalised recommendations