Abstract
This paper analyzes the formation of cooperation in the two-player “Prisoner’s Dilemma Game” and “Trust Game.” Cooperation is attained in the Long-Run Equilibrium (Kandori et al [1993]) if players form expectations about their payoffs simply based on their experiences and make a “cautious” experimentation. Using this model, the closed society (Japanese society) and the open society (the United States society) is characterized by the difference of the level of experimentation.
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© 2002 Springer Japan
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Fujiyama, H. (2002). Evolution of Cooperation in a Situation with a Risk: a Closed Society versus an Open Society. In: Jin, Q., Li, J., Zhang, N., Cheng, J., Yu, C., Noguchi, S. (eds) Enabling Society with Information Technology. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-66979-1_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-66979-1_22
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