Evolution of Cooperation in a Situation with a Risk: a Closed Society versus an Open Society

  • Hideki Fujiyama
Conference paper


This paper analyzes the formation of cooperation in the two-player “Prisoner’s Dilemma Game” and “Trust Game.” Cooperation is attained in the Long-Run Equilibrium (Kandori et al [1993]) if players form expectations about their payoffs simply based on their experiences and make a “cautious” experimentation. Using this model, the closed society (Japanese society) and the open society (the United States society) is characterized by the difference of the level of experimentation.


Expected Payoff Open Society Payoff Matrix Strategic Game Trust Game 
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Copyright information

© Springer Japan 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hideki Fujiyama
    • 1
  1. 1.Dokkyo UniversitySaitamaJapan

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