An Agenda-Setting Game of the Landmine Ban Treaty

  • Hikaru HayashiEmail author
Part of the The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific book series (PEAP)


This study examines, from the rationalist perspective, the process and the outcome of the formation of the Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Treaty (the Ottawa Convention) established in 1997. This unprecedented treaty was established due to the leadership of middle powers such as Canada and European countries with the support of NGOs, which overcame the opposition of the USA and Asian countries. A rationalist explanation models the change from the status quo (no regulation) to a drastic state (a comprehensive ban) by focusing not on the diffusion of the anti-landmine norm but on the procedural rules adopted in a series of anti-landmine conferences. As an extension of the agenda-setter model, the model presented here assumes the agenda setter’s incomplete information on the pivotal voter’s preference. Solving for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this model, this study shows a drastic change is possible if the status quo is unfavorable both to the agenda setter and the pivotal voter. This result agrees with the empirical observations of the Ottawa Process where Canada successfully induced a comprehensive ban of anti-personnel landmines despite opposition.


Landmine Ban Treaty Ottawa convention Bayesian game Agenda setting Asia 


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Copyright information

© Springer Japan KK 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.KobeJapan

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