Abstract
Since the end of the Cold War, a number of regional arrangements have been established to quell local violence. Some scholars welcome the proliferation of actors dispatching peacekeepers, believing that it will reduce the burden of the United Nations (UN), while others suspect that such cohabitation may result in the UN’s buck-passing, allowing it to circumvent conflicts where no major powers’ interests are at stake. I use a game-theoretic model to address questions of how the availability of an alternative affects the likelihood of UN intervention and how the organization leading an operation alters the extent of personnel contributions of member states. My main findings are threefold. First, the UN may pass the buck if countries in a conflict-affected region have a sufficient capacity to handle the conflict on their own. Second, countries in a region that has set up an institutional mechanism of regional arrangements tend to make larger contributions to a UN-led operation than countries in a region without such an institutional setup. Third, states may dispatch more troops to a UN peacekeeping mission than to a mission of their own, especially when they can deploy only a small number of peacekeeping troops by themselves. The second and third findings suggest that states in a region with a weak framework of conflict management may contribute a significant number of military personnel to a UN-led mission to secure the involvement of the UN by reducing the burden of countries outside the region. I illustrate the logic behind each of these by using conflicts in Asia.
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Notes
- 1.
Non-UN peacekeeping missions were established even during the Cold War. For example, in May 1965, the Organization of American States sent approximately 14,000 peacekeepers to the Dominican Republic (Mullenbach 2005, 531).
- 2.
The largest regional security institution is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), consisting of 22 member states. However, in ARF, government officials seek to resolve conflicts through diplomatic consultations rather than by using military force.
- 3.
For example, Caballero-Anthony (2008, 171) argues that countries in Southeast Asia have been a strong proponent of national sovereignty and the principle of non-interference, embracing the so-called “ASEAN Way”.
- 4.
For a critique of ASEAN members’s reluctance to involve in a regional conflict, see Dupont (2000, 167).
- 5.
For example, civil wars that end in victory of one side are less likely to experience a UN peacekeeping mission (Fortna 2004, 2008; Mullenbach 2005); civil wars generating a significant number of fatalities or refugees are positively associated with the deployment of peacekeeping missions (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Stojek and Tir 2015); countries with large military troops are less likely to invite peacekeeping operations (Aydin 2010; Fortna 2004, 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003).
- 6.
Although initial studies tend to focus on the financial burden-sharing of missions (Bobrow and Boyer 1997; Khanna et al., 1998; Shimizu and Sandler 2002; Gaibulloev et al., 2009), more recent studies also address personnel contributions to the UN and non-UN peacekeeping missions (Banerjee 2008; Bobrow and Boyer 1997; Bove and Elia 2011; Victor 2010).
- 7.
For example, the Secretariat proposed that approximately 34,000 troops are required to protect the seven safe areas in the former Yugoslavia. However, the Security Council authorized a mission with 7600 personnel and of these, only about 3000 peacekeepers were actually deployed (Krasno 2004, 255).
- 8.
I impose this assumption because all of the post-Cold War UN operations have been established by the Security Council.
- 9.
Note that I assume that state A is a country outside the conflict-affected region. Thus, when we examine a conflict in Asia in the subsequent sections, China is not treated as state A.
- 10.
This assumption indicates that if state j is indifferent about whether to dispatch troops, it will dispatch troops.
- 11.
Note that \( {\widehat{m}}_A \) is a solution if \( 0\le {\widehat{m}}_A<{m}^{*} \).
- 12.
Note that \( {\overset{-}{m}}_A \) is a solution if \( 0\le {\overset{-}{m}}_A<{m}^{*}-{m}_B \) is true. Also, note that \( {\overset{-}{m}}_A \) is smaller than \( {\widehat{m}}_A \) by the amount of state B’s contribution (i.e., \( {\widehat{m}}_A-{m}_B= \) \( {\overset{-}{m}}_A \)).
- 13.
Note that \( {\widehat{m}}_B \) is a solution if \( 0\le {\widehat{m}}_B<{m}^{*} \) holds.
- 14.
Note that \( {\overset{-}{m}}_B \) is a solution if \( 0\le {\overset{-}{m}}_B<{m}^{*}-{m}_A \) is true. Notice also that as state A’s contribution increases, the value of \( {\overset{-}{m}}_B \) decreases, and that \( {\widehat{m}}_B \) is greater than \( {\overset{-}{m}}_B \) by the amount that state A contributes (i.e., \( {\widehat{m}}_B-{m}_A={\overset{-}{m}}_B \)).
- 15.
Thus, it is optimal for state B to play m B = 0 in this case.
- 16.
Note that this condition is equivalent to \( \frac{e_B}{k_B}\ge {m}_D+{m}_E. \)
- 17.
Notice that \( {\bar{m}}_A>0 \) because \( {m}_B<{\widehat{m}}_A \) is true.
- 18.
Note that \( {\overset{-}{m}}_A+{m}_B={\widehat{m}}_A \).
- 19.
Notice that if \( {\widehat{m}}_A<{\widehat{m}}_B \), then \( {\widehat{m}}_A<{\dot{m}}_B \). Conversely, if \( {\widehat{m}}_A>{\widehat{m}}_B \) then \( {\widehat{m}}_A>{\dot{m}}_B \).
- 20.
To satisfy this condition, we must have \( {k}_A\left({m}_D+{m}_E+{\widehat{m}}_A\right)<{e}_A \) (i.e., \( \sqrt{\frac{e_A}{k_A}\left({m}_D+{m}_E\right)}<\frac{e_A}{k_A} \)). This condition holds as long as \( \frac{e_A}{k_A}>{m}_D+{m}_E \) is true.
- 21.
In Fig. 4.1, I illustrate the case in which \( {\widehat{m}}_A<{m}^{*}-{M}_A \) holds.
- 22.
See footnote 19.
- 23.
For example, China could not intervene in the conflict without invoking the intervention of other major powers, and Japan could not dispatch troops overseas under its constitution.
- 24.
- 25.
The United States promised that it would provide 385 non-combat personnel and stationed 1000 U.S. marines offshore of East Timor (Martin 2001, 113).
- 26.
Resolution 1264 stressed that INTERFET should be “replaced as soon as possible by a UN peacekeeping operation.”
- 27.
For instance, third parties may receive different negative externalities as the battle proceeds, and the military balance between the disputants may shift over time.
- 28.
The number presented below shows the total number of military, police, and civilian personnel contributions.
- 29.
At the early stage of the deployment of UNTAC, the total contributions by countries in the Asia-Pacific region was 2757, which constituted about 87 % of the total deployment. However, this seems to be because of their proximity to the conflict, meaning that they could dispatch their troops sooner than countries outside the region. Since 1993, the percentage of contributions has remained around 54 %.
- 30.
Throughout the deployment of UNTAET, the percentage of contributions by countries in the Asia-Pacific region did not fall below 66 %.
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Iwanami, Y. (2017). Peacekeeping by the UN and Regional Organizations: Sharing the Burden or Passing the Buck?. In: Suzuki, M., Okada, A. (eds) Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia. The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-56466-9_4
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