Traditional Communities

Chapter
Part of the Advances in Japanese Business and Economics book series (AJBE, volume 16)

Abstract

In the following two chapters, we turn to the economic analysis of a community, which we defined in Chap.  1 as a network of people who are not motivated to seek profits. The family we discussed in the last two chapters is an example of the community, but communities extend beyond families.

References

  1. Abreu, D. (1988). On the theory of infinitely repeated games with discounting. Econometrica, 56, 383–396.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Andreoni, J. (1988). Privately provided public-goods in a large economy-the limits of altruism. Journal of Public Economics, 83, 57–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
  4. Bergstrom, T., Blume, L., & Varian, H. R. (1986). On the private provision of public goods. Journal of Public Economics, 29, 25–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Bliss, C., & Nalebuff, B. (1984). Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good. Journal of Public Economics, 25(1–2), 1–12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Clutton-Brock, T. H., & Parker, G. A. (1995). Punishment in animal societies. Nature, 373, 209–216.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Heutel, G. (2009). Crowding out and crowding in of private donations and government grants. NBER Working Papers 15004.Google Scholar
  8. Khanna, J., & Sandler, T. (2000). Partners in giving: The crowding-in effects of UK Government grants. European Economic Review, 44(8), 1543–1556.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Kropotkin, P. (1902). Mutual aid: A factor of evolution. London: Heinemann.Google Scholar
  10. Manzoor, S., & Straub, J. (2005). The Robustness of Kingma’s crowd-out estimate: Evidence from new data on contributions to public radio. Public Choice, 123, 463–476.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Payne, M. (2001). Measuring the effect of federal research funding on private donations at research universities: Is federal research funding more than a substitute for private donations? International Tax and Public Finance, 8(5–6), 731–751.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Rege, M. (2004). Social norms and private provision of public goods. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 6(1), 65–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Rose-Ackerman, S. (1986). Do government grants to charity reduce private donations? In S. Rose-Ackerman (Ed.), The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions: Studies in Structure and Policy (pp. 313–329). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  15. Sethi, R., & Somanathan, E. (1996). The evolution of social norms in common property resource use. The American Economic Review, 86(4), 766–788.Google Scholar
  16. Warr, P. G. (1982). Pareto optimal redistribution and private charity. Journal of Public Economics, 19, 131–138.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Warr, P. G. (1983). The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income. Economics Letters, 13, 207–211.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Watanabe, Y., & Hojo, H. (1975). Forest Iriai and Village Structure. University of Tokyo Press. (in Japanese).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Japan KK 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of International and Public PolicyHitotsubashi UniversityKunitachiJapan

Personalised recommendations