Introduction to Decision Theories

Chapter
First Online:
Part of the Advances in Japanese Business and Economics book series (AJBE, volume 16)

Abstract

In this section, we provide a brief introduction to decision theory to understand our theoretical arguments on the social transformation in Part II.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access

References

  1. Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
  2. Buchanan, M. (1975). The Samaritan’s dilemma. In E. S. Phelps (Ed.), Altruism, morality, and economic theory. New York: Russel Sage Foundation.Google Scholar
  3. Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1991). Game theory. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  4. Gordon, R., & Varian, H. (1988). Intergenerational risk sharing. Journal of Public Economics, 37, 185–202.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243–1248.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Kornai, J. (1979). Economics of shortage. Amsterdam: North-Holland.Google Scholar
  7. Johnson, D. D. P., & Krüger, O. (2004). The good of wrath: Supernatural punishment and the evolution of cooperation. Political Theology, 5(2), 159–176.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Maskin, E. (1996). Theories of the soft budget constraint. Japan and the World Economy, 8, 125–133.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Osborn, M. (2003). An introduction to game theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  10. Osborn, M., & Rubinshtein, A. (1994). A course in game theory. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  11. Shiller, R. J. (1999). Social security and intergenerational, intragenerational and international risk sharing. Carnegie-Rochester Series in Public Policy, 50, 165–204.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1943). Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  13. Nash, J. F. (1950). The bargaining problem. Econometrica, 18, 155–162.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Yamashige, S. (1997). Fairness in markets and government policies: A weak equity criterion for allocation mechanisms. Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 38, 61–78.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Japan KK 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of International and Public PolicyHitotsubashi UniversityKunitachiJapan

Personalised recommendations