Abstract
In this chapter, we analyze mechanisms of integration and secession among several regions. In particular, we examine a three-region model using policy preference approach when there are policy conflicts among regions. By considering incentives of policy decisions in each region, we show the possibility of integration and secession and how the welfare of each region is realized through strategic determination of policy.
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Hosoe, M. (2018). Integration and Secession Under Threat of Third Region. In: Hosoe, M. (eds) Regional Economic Analysis of Power, Elections, and Secession. New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives, vol 21. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55897-2_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55897-2_4
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