Abstract
In this chapter, we analyze the endogenous determination of integration and secession by introducing policy preference and policy conflict cost, stressing on representative election and political governance .
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Hosoe, M. (2018). Secession, Representative Elections, and Political Governance. In: Hosoe, M. (eds) Regional Economic Analysis of Power, Elections, and Secession. New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives, vol 21. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55897-2_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55897-2_2
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