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The New Corporate Criminal Law and Transnational Legal Risk

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Flexibility in Modern Business Law

Abstract

This chapter examines the transnational character of the ‘new corporate criminal law’ and identifies some of the consequences for any business that operates across borders, notably the expansion of transnational legal risk. A response to this expansion in legal risk has been the growth of adaptive and flexible “compliance” mechanisms within organizational governance. From the perspective of regulators, the new corporate criminal law also creates new sources of risk and the chapter will suggest that the increased importance of transnational regulatory networks between regulators is an adaptation to the new legal reality. The chapter concludes by suggesting that one important consequence of this expansion in new scope of legal risk is a transformation in the normative character of criminal law, as it applies to corporations.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For the history of corporate criminal liability, see Wells (2001).

  2. 2.

    The so-called principle of societies delinquere non potest. For early English cases, see, The Case Suttons Hospital (1612) holding that a corporation is “incapable of an act understanding and it has no will to exercise”.

  3. 3.

    Blackstone (1979), p. 464.

  4. 4.

    Wells (2001), chp. 2.

  5. 5.

    See, generally, Bernard (1984).

  6. 6.

    New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. US, (1909) 212 U.S. 481.

  7. 7.

    See Khanna (1996).

  8. 8.

    See Gobert (1994).

  9. 9.

    For a discussion of the principles underling the traditional continental European approach, see Leigh (1977).

  10. 10.

    On this controversy and marginalization generally, see Hamdani and Klement (2008), Khanna (1996), and Laufer (1994).

  11. 11.

    See Heine (1998).

  12. 12.

    On Japan, see Kyoto (1996).

  13. 13.

    See Beck (2010).

  14. 14.

    On this trend, see Larkin (2013).

  15. 15.

    On the new era of enforcement, see Orland (2006).

  16. 16.

    See Fisse (1983).

  17. 17.

    Fisse (1983), p. 1160.

  18. 18.

    See Slaughter and Zaring (1997).

  19. 19.

    For the “story” of the FCPA, see Koehler (2012a).

  20. 20.

    For developments at the level of public international law, see Spahn (2012, 2013).

  21. 21.

    For an overview of developments, see Jordan (2012).

  22. 22.

    On this process of “cycling”, see Komesar (1997, 2001).

  23. 23.

    See Callies and Zumbansen (2010).

  24. 24.

    See Fenwick et al. (2014).

  25. 25.

    See, for example, Slaughter (2004).

  26. 26.

    See, for example, Callies and Zumbansen (2010) and Kjaer (2010).

  27. 27.

    See Braithwaite and Drahos (2000), Burris et al. (2005), and Drahos (2010).

  28. 28.

    See, for example, Cassese (2005) and Kingsbury et al. (2005). For a more recent collection of essays, see Anthony et al. (eds) (2011).

  29. 29.

    For example, the 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs facilitated the creation of new national agencies to coordinate international efforts at drug control.

  30. 30.

    See Kaul and Conceicao (eds) (2010).

  31. 31.

    See Craig (2011), p. 107.

  32. 32.

    See Vermeule (2006).

  33. 33.

    For an account of regulatory networks that places particular emphasis on epistemic communities, see Braithwaite and Drahos (2000).

  34. 34.

    See Ladeur (1997).

  35. 35.

    See Braithwaite and Drahos (2000).

  36. 36.

    See Kaplan (2013). See also the Financial Times (2014/4/24) in which the rising significance of compliance is introduced with the anecdote that in the 1980s the compliance officer of a well-known City of London firm was charged with “looking after the boss’s wine cellar”. Now, compliance “is one of the hottest areas of financial recruitment, according to headhunters. The age of the compliance officer is upon us”.

  37. 37.

    See Koehler (2012b) for a comparative analysis of the compliance defense in different jurisdictions.

  38. 38.

    On the rise of the deferred prosecution agreement in the context of corporate criminal procedure, see Garrett (2014).

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  1. Faculty of Law, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan

    Mark Fenwick

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  1. Faculty of Law, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Fukuoka, Japan

    Mark Fenwick

  2. Faculty of Law, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Fukuoka, Japan

    Stefan Wrbka

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Fenwick, M. (2016). The New Corporate Criminal Law and Transnational Legal Risk. In: Fenwick, M., Wrbka, S. (eds) Flexibility in Modern Business Law. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55787-6_8

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