Equilibrium Selection\(^{*}\)

Part of the Monographs in Mathematical Economics book series (MOME, volume 1)


In this chapter, we introduce notions of payoff dominance and risk dominance, explain their meanings, and also extend the risk dominance concept to p-dominance. In addition, we illustrate how equilibrium selection is performed using the example of global games, which is relevant to many economic situations.


Nash Equilibrium Strategy Combination Strategy Distribution Stage Game Equilibrium Selection 
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Copyright information

© Springer Japan 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsKeio UniversityMinato-kuJapan

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