Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

  • Takako Fujiwara-Greve
Part of the Monographs in Mathematical Economics book series (MOME, volume 1)


In this chapter we consider extensive-form games in which the payoff functions are not common knowledge. We introduce the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and analyze signaling games.


Payoff Function Pure Strategy Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Decision Node Payoff Vector 
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Copyright information

© Springer Japan 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsKeio UniversityMinato-kuJapan

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