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Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

  • Takako Fujiwara-Greve
Part of the Monographs in Mathematical Economics book series (MOME, volume 1)

Abstract

In this chapter, we explain Harsanyi’s Bayesian framework for games with incomplete information. For normal-form games with incomplete information, Bayesian games and Bayesian Nash equilibrium are defined.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Incomplete Information Payoff Function Pure Strategy Expected Payoff 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Japan 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsKeio UniversityMinato-kuJapan

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