Part of the Monographs in Mathematical Economics book series (MOME, volume 1)
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
In this chapter, we explain Harsanyi’s Bayesian framework for games with incomplete information. For normal-form games with incomplete information, Bayesian games and Bayesian Nash equilibrium are defined.
KeywordsNash Equilibrium Incomplete Information Payoff Function Pure Strategy Expected Payoff
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
- 3.Fudenberg D, Tirole J (1991) Game theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
- 6.Harsanyi J (1968) Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players, part II: Bayesian equilibrium points. Manage Sci 14(5):320–334Google Scholar
- 11.Klemperer P (2004) Auctions: theory and practice. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJGoogle Scholar
- 14.Watson J (2007) Strategy: an introduction to game theory, 2nd edn. Norton, New York, NYGoogle Scholar
© Springer Japan 2015