Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

Part of the Monographs in Mathematical Economics book series (MOME, volume 1)


In this chapter, we explain Harsanyi’s Bayesian framework for games with incomplete information. For normal-form games with incomplete information, Bayesian games and Bayesian Nash equilibrium are defined.


Nash Equilibrium Incomplete Information Payoff Function Pure Strategy Expected Payoff 


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Copyright information

© Springer Japan 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsKeio UniversityMinato-kuJapan

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