Strategic Dominance

  • Takako Fujiwara-Greve
Part of the Monographs in Mathematical Economics book series (MOME, volume 1)


This chapter formulates normal-form (strategic-form) games, explains strategic dominance, and introduces an equilibrium concept through iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies.


Nash Equilibrium Payoff Function Dominant Strategy Strategy Combination Plea Bargain 
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Copyright information

© Springer Japan 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsKeio UniversityMinato-kuJapan

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