Abstract
This chapter examines whether privatization improves social welfare in a Stackelberg mixed oligopoly. Extending the pioneering study of De Fraja and Delbono (Oxf Econ Pap 41(1):302–311, 1989) to Stackelberg competitions between a public firm and private firms, we investigate whether privatization increases social welfare in a sequential-move game. We consider the different competitive environments in which even after privatization, a public firm’s Stackelberg position is maintained. We demonstrate the following results: First, when a public firm acts as a Stackelberg leader before and after privatization, privatization necessarily decreases social welfare irrespective of the number of private firms. Second, even when a public firm acts as a Stackelberg follower before and after privatization, privatization decreases social welfare if the number of private firms is relatively small.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Throughout this chapter, we denote the equilibrium variables when a public firm acts as a Stackelberg leader before and after privatization by the superscripts \( LB \) (leader before) and \( LA \) (leader after), respectively. Likewise, we use the superscripts \( FB \) (follower before) and \( FA \) (follower after) when a public firm acts as a follower before and after privatization, respectively. Superscript \( C \) denotes the Cournot equilibrium.
- 3.
By tedious calculation, \( {W}^{LA} \) is rearranged as follows: \( {W}^{LA}=\frac{Z{a}^2}{2{\left(X+k+1\right)}^2{Y}^2} \), where \( Z\equiv {k}^2{n}^4+k\left(k+2\right)\left(3k+2\right){n}^3+{\left(k+1\right)}^2\left(3{k}^2+11k+4\right){n}^2+{\left(k+1\right)}^3\left({k}^2+7k+8\right)n+{\left(k+1\right)}^4\left(k+3\right) \).
- 4.
We distinguish the reaction functions before and after privatization with the inclusion of the superscripts \( B \) (before) and \( A \) (after).
- 5.
\( {n}^{+}(k)\equiv \frac{\left(k+1\right)\left(k+2\right)\left(3{k}^2+8k+2\right)+\sqrt{Z(k)}}{2\left(k+1\right)\left({k}^3+2{k}^2\hbox{--} k-1\right)} \) and \( {n}^{-}(k)\equiv \frac{\left(k+1\right)\left(k+2\right)\left(3{k}^2+8k+2\right)-\sqrt{Z(k)}}{2\left(k+1\right)\left({k}^3+2{k}^2\hbox{--} k-1\right)} \), where \( Z(k)\equiv {\left(k+1\right)}^2{\left(k+2\right)}^2{\left(3{k}^2+8k+2\right)}^2+4\left(k+1\right)\left({k}^3+2{k}^2\hbox{--} k-1\right){\left(k+2\right)}^2{\left({k}^2+3k+1\right)}^2 \).
References
Beato P, Mas-Colell A (1984) The marginal cost pricing as a regulation mechanism in mixed markets. In: Marchand MG, Pestieau P, Tulkens H (eds) The performance of public enterprises: concepts and measurement. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 81–100
De Fraja G, Delbono F (1989) Alternative strategies of a public enterprise in oligopoly. Oxford Econ Pap 41(1):302–311
De Fraja G, Delbono F (1990) Game theoretic models of mixed oligopoly. J Econ Surv 4(1):1–17
Fjell K, Heywood J (2004) Mixed oligopoly, subsidization and the order of firm’s moves: the relevance of privatization. Econ Lett 83(3):411–416
Jacques A (2004) Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly: a forgotten equilibrium. Econ Lett 83(2):147–148
Lu Y (2006) Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with foreign competitors: the linear demand case. J Econ 88(1):49–68
Lu Y (2007) Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly: another forgotten equilibrium. Econ Lett 94(2):226–227
Matsumura T (2003a) Endogenous role in mixed markets: a two-production-period model. South Econ J 70(2):403–413
Matsumura T (2003b) Stackelberg mixed duopoly with a foreign competitor. Bull Econ Res 55(3):275–287
Matsumura T, Shimizu D (2010) Privatization waves. Manch Sch 78(6):609–625
Pal D (1998) Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly. Econ Lett 61(2):181–185
Acknowledgments
This study was supported in part by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (KAKENHI, grant no. 16K03615 and 16H03612) from Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. The usual disclaimer applies.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Appendix
Appendix
1.1 A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
By simple calculation, the following equation is satisfied:
\( \iff {\left[{\left(k+1\right)}^3-{n}^2k\right]}^2\ge 0 \). The equality holds only when \( n={\left(\frac{{\left(k+1\right)}^3}{k}\right)}^{\frac{1}{2}} \).
1.2 A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
By direct calculation, the following relationship is satisfied: \( {W}^{FB}\gtrless\ {W}^{FA}\iff \)
\( \iff D\left(n,k\right)\equiv \left(k+1\right)\left({k}^3+2{k}^2 - k-1\right){n}^2-\left(k+1\right)\left(k+2\right)\left(3{k}^2+8k+2\right)n-{\left(k+2\right)}^2{\left({k}^2+3k+1\right)}^2\lessgtr 0 \). \( {k}^{+} \) denotes the positive real-valued solution of the cubic equation, \( f(k)\equiv {k}^3+2{k}^2-k-1=0 \), which is approximately 0.8019. When \( k={k}^{+} \), because \( f\left({k}^{+}\right)=0 \) holds, \( D\left(n,{k}^{+}\right) \) is a linear function of \( n \) and \( D\left(n,{k}^{+}\right)=-52.23n-128.71<0\forall n \). Thus, when \( k={k}^{+} \), it is necessarily satisfied that \( {W}^{FB}>{W}^{FA} \). When \( k\ne {k}^{+} \), i.e., \( f(k)\ne 0 \), \( D\left(n,k\right) \) is a quadratic equation of \( n \). Denote two solutions of \( D\left(n,k\right)=0 \) with respect to \( n \) as \( {n}^{+}(k) \) and \( {n}^{-}(k) \), where \( {n}^{+}(k)>{n}^{-}(k) \).Footnote 5 Note that \( {n}^{-}(k)<0 \) for all \( k>0 \). As \( f(k)<0 \) holds when \( k\in \left(0,\;{k}^{+}\right) \), \( D\left(n,k\right) \) is a quadratic function of \( n \) in which the coefficient of the square of \( n \) is negative and \( {n}^{+}(k)<0 \) also holds. Thus, when \( k\in \left(0,\;{k}^{+}\right) \), \( D\left(n,k\right) \) is always negative for all \( n>0 \) and \( {W}^{FB}>{W}^{FA} \) holds. However, as \( f(k)>0 \) holds when \( k>{k}^{+} \), \( D\left(n,k\right) \) is a quadratic function of \( n \) in which the coefficient of the square of \( n \) is positive and \( {n}^{+}(k)>0 \) holds. In this case, if \( n\in \left(0,{n}^{+}(k)\right) \), \( D\left(n,k\right) \) is negative and as a result, \( {W}^{FB}>{W}^{FA} \) is satisfied; if \( n>{n}^{+}(k) \), \( D\left(n,k\right)>0 \) and \( {W}^{FB}<{W}^{FA} \) is possible to occur. Note that \( {n}^{+}(k) \) has the minimum value when \( k>{k}^{+} \). When \( k={k}^{\min}\approx 3.489 \), the minimum value is \( {n}^{+ \min}\equiv {n}^{+}\left({k}^{\min}\right)\approx 11.216 \). Therefore, for all values of \( k \), if \( n=\left\{1,2,\cdots,\;11\right\} \), it is necessarily satisfied that \( D\left(n,k\right) \) is negative, that is, \( {W}^{FB}>{W}^{FA} \). When \( n\ge 12 \), \( {W}^{FB}>{W}^{FA} \) if \( n<{n}^{+}(k) \) and otherwise vice versa.
1.3 A.3.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3
By direct calculation, the following equations are satisfied: \( {W}^{FB} > {W}^{LB}\iff \frac{\left(k+1\right){n}^2+\left(k+1\right)\left(k+4\right)n+{\left(k+2\right)}^2}{\left(k+1\right){\left(Y+1\right)}^2}>\frac{X+nk\left(Y+1\right)}{X+k{Y}^2}\iff nk\left(n+2k+3\right)>0 \) and \( {W}^{LB} > {W}^{CB} \) \( \iff \frac{X+nk\left(Y+1\right)}{X+k{Y}^2}>\frac{{\left(k+1\right)}^3+nk\left(nk+{k}^2+4k+2\right)}{X^2}\iff {n}^2{k}^2>0 \).
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 Springer Japan
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hamada, K. (2017). Privatization in a Stackelberg Mixed Oligopoly. In: Yanagihara, M., Kunizaki, M. (eds) The Theory of Mixed Oligopoly. New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives, vol 14. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55633-6_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55633-6_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Tokyo
Print ISBN: 978-4-431-55632-9
Online ISBN: 978-4-431-55633-6
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)