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Privatization in a Stackelberg Mixed Oligopoly

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The Theory of Mixed Oligopoly

Part of the book series: New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives ((NFRSASIPER,volume 14))

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Abstract

This chapter examines whether privatization improves social welfare in a Stackelberg mixed oligopoly. Extending the pioneering study of De Fraja and Delbono (Oxf Econ Pap 41(1):302–311, 1989) to Stackelberg competitions between a public firm and private firms, we investigate whether privatization increases social welfare in a sequential-move game. We consider the different competitive environments in which even after privatization, a public firm’s Stackelberg position is maintained. We demonstrate the following results: First, when a public firm acts as a Stackelberg leader before and after privatization, privatization necessarily decreases social welfare irrespective of the number of private firms. Second, even when a public firm acts as a Stackelberg follower before and after privatization, privatization decreases social welfare if the number of private firms is relatively small.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We omit the details of the survey on mixed oligopoly and privatization. De Fraja and Delbono (1990) reviewed various mixed oligopoly models including different move orders in oligopolistic games. For a recent survey on a mixed oligopoly, see Matsumura and Shimizu (2010).

  2. 2.

    Throughout this chapter, we denote the equilibrium variables when a public firm acts as a Stackelberg leader before and after privatization by the superscripts \( LB \) (leader before) and \( LA \) (leader after), respectively. Likewise, we use the superscripts \( FB \) (follower before) and \( FA \) (follower after) when a public firm acts as a follower before and after privatization, respectively. Superscript \( C \) denotes the Cournot equilibrium.

  3. 3.

    By tedious calculation, \( {W}^{LA} \) is rearranged as follows: \( {W}^{LA}=\frac{Z{a}^2}{2{\left(X+k+1\right)}^2{Y}^2} \), where \( Z\equiv {k}^2{n}^4+k\left(k+2\right)\left(3k+2\right){n}^3+{\left(k+1\right)}^2\left(3{k}^2+11k+4\right){n}^2+{\left(k+1\right)}^3\left({k}^2+7k+8\right)n+{\left(k+1\right)}^4\left(k+3\right) \).

  4. 4.

    We distinguish the reaction functions before and after privatization with the inclusion of the superscripts \( B \) (before) and \( A \) (after).

  5. 5.

    \( {n}^{+}(k)\equiv \frac{\left(k+1\right)\left(k+2\right)\left(3{k}^2+8k+2\right)+\sqrt{Z(k)}}{2\left(k+1\right)\left({k}^3+2{k}^2\hbox{--} k-1\right)} \) and \( {n}^{-}(k)\equiv \frac{\left(k+1\right)\left(k+2\right)\left(3{k}^2+8k+2\right)-\sqrt{Z(k)}}{2\left(k+1\right)\left({k}^3+2{k}^2\hbox{--} k-1\right)} \), where \( Z(k)\equiv {\left(k+1\right)}^2{\left(k+2\right)}^2{\left(3{k}^2+8k+2\right)}^2+4\left(k+1\right)\left({k}^3+2{k}^2\hbox{--} k-1\right){\left(k+2\right)}^2{\left({k}^2+3k+1\right)}^2 \).

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Acknowledgments

This study was supported in part by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (KAKENHI, grant no. 16K03615 and 16H03612) from Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. The usual disclaimer applies.

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Correspondence to Kojun Hamada .

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Appendix

Appendix

1.1 A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1

By simple calculation, the following equation is satisfied:

$$ {W}^{LB}\ge {W}^{LA}\iff \frac{X+nk\left(Y+1\right)}{X+k{Y}^2}\ge \frac{n{X}^2\left(Y+1\right)+2\left(k+1\right)X{Y}^2+\left(1-k\right){\left(1+k\right)}^2{Y}^2}{{\left(X+k+1\right)}^2{Y}^2} $$
$$ \begin{array}{l}\iff {\left(X+k+1\right)}^2{Y}^2\left[X+nk\left(Y+1\right)\right]\left(X+k{Y}^2\right)\hfill \\ {}\times \left[n{X}^2\left(Y+1\right)+2X{Y}^2\left(k+1\right)\left(1-k\right){\left(k+1\right)}^2{Y}^2\right]\ge 0\hfill \end{array} $$

\( \iff {\left[{\left(k+1\right)}^3-{n}^2k\right]}^2\ge 0 \). The equality holds only when \( n={\left(\frac{{\left(k+1\right)}^3}{k}\right)}^{\frac{1}{2}} \).

1.2 A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2

By direct calculation, the following relationship is satisfied: \( {W}^{FB}\gtrless\ {W}^{FA}\iff \)

$$ \frac{\left(k+1\right){n}^2+\left(k+1\right)\left(k+4\right)n+{\left(k+2\right)}^2}{\left(k+1\right){\left(Y+1\right)}^2}\gtrless \frac{{\left(k+1\right)}^2{\left(k+2\right)}^2{n}^2+\left(k+1\right){\left(k+2\right)}^2\left({k}^2+5k+2\right)n+\left(k+3\right){\left({k}^2+3k+1\right)}^2}{{\left(k+2\right)}^2{\left(X+n+k\right)}^2} $$

\( \iff D\left(n,k\right)\equiv \left(k+1\right)\left({k}^3+2{k}^2 - k-1\right){n}^2-\left(k+1\right)\left(k+2\right)\left(3{k}^2+8k+2\right)n-{\left(k+2\right)}^2{\left({k}^2+3k+1\right)}^2\lessgtr 0 \). \( {k}^{+} \) denotes the positive real-valued solution of the cubic equation, \( f(k)\equiv {k}^3+2{k}^2-k-1=0 \), which is approximately 0.8019. When \( k={k}^{+} \), because \( f\left({k}^{+}\right)=0 \) holds, \( D\left(n,{k}^{+}\right) \) is a linear function of \( n \) and \( D\left(n,{k}^{+}\right)=-52.23n-128.71<0\forall n \). Thus, when \( k={k}^{+} \), it is necessarily satisfied that \( {W}^{FB}>{W}^{FA} \). When \( k\ne {k}^{+} \), i.e., \( f(k)\ne 0 \), \( D\left(n,k\right) \) is a quadratic equation of \( n \). Denote two solutions of \( D\left(n,k\right)=0 \) with respect to \( n \) as \( {n}^{+}(k) \) and \( {n}^{-}(k) \), where \( {n}^{+}(k)>{n}^{-}(k) \).Footnote 5 Note that \( {n}^{-}(k)<0 \) for all \( k>0 \). As \( f(k)<0 \) holds when \( k\in \left(0,\;{k}^{+}\right) \), \( D\left(n,k\right) \) is a quadratic function of \( n \) in which the coefficient of the square of \( n \) is negative and \( {n}^{+}(k)<0 \) also holds. Thus, when \( k\in \left(0,\;{k}^{+}\right) \), \( D\left(n,k\right) \) is always negative for all \( n>0 \) and \( {W}^{FB}>{W}^{FA} \) holds. However, as \( f(k)>0 \) holds when \( k>{k}^{+} \), \( D\left(n,k\right) \) is a quadratic function of \( n \) in which the coefficient of the square of \( n \) is positive and \( {n}^{+}(k)>0 \) holds. In this case, if \( n\in \left(0,{n}^{+}(k)\right) \), \( D\left(n,k\right) \) is negative and as a result, \( {W}^{FB}>{W}^{FA} \) is satisfied; if \( n>{n}^{+}(k) \), \( D\left(n,k\right)>0 \) and \( {W}^{FB}<{W}^{FA} \) is possible to occur. Note that \( {n}^{+}(k) \) has the minimum value when \( k>{k}^{+} \). When \( k={k}^{\min}\approx 3.489 \), the minimum value is \( {n}^{+ \min}\equiv {n}^{+}\left({k}^{\min}\right)\approx 11.216 \). Therefore, for all values of \( k \), if \( n=\left\{1,2,\cdots,\;11\right\} \), it is necessarily satisfied that \( D\left(n,k\right) \) is negative, that is, \( {W}^{FB}>{W}^{FA} \). When \( n\ge 12 \), \( {W}^{FB}>{W}^{FA} \) if \( n<{n}^{+}(k) \) and otherwise vice versa.

1.3 A.3.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3

By direct calculation, the following equations are satisfied: \( {W}^{FB} > {W}^{LB}\iff \frac{\left(k+1\right){n}^2+\left(k+1\right)\left(k+4\right)n+{\left(k+2\right)}^2}{\left(k+1\right){\left(Y+1\right)}^2}>\frac{X+nk\left(Y+1\right)}{X+k{Y}^2}\iff nk\left(n+2k+3\right)>0 \) and \( {W}^{LB} > {W}^{CB} \) \( \iff \frac{X+nk\left(Y+1\right)}{X+k{Y}^2}>\frac{{\left(k+1\right)}^3+nk\left(nk+{k}^2+4k+2\right)}{X^2}\iff {n}^2{k}^2>0 \).

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Hamada, K. (2017). Privatization in a Stackelberg Mixed Oligopoly. In: Yanagihara, M., Kunizaki, M. (eds) The Theory of Mixed Oligopoly. New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives, vol 14. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55633-6_3

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