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Government Intervention Brings About Free-Trade Outcomes in the Long Run

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Regional Free Trade Areas and Strategic Trade Policies

Part of the book series: New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives ((NFRSASIPER,volume 10))

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Abstract

We examine the long-run effect of government intervention on economic outcomes in an importing country in a three-country framework with free entry of the importing country’s firms. We establish the following. [1] The long-run equilibrium total output (or price) level under government intervention regime is the same as that under the free-trade regime. Without the imposition of a tariff, the importing country’s welfare is unaffected by any level of export subsidy. [2] In the long-run equilibrium, each exporting country’s government sets a positive subsidy level such that each exporter can attain the equilibrium outcome when it adopts marginal cost pricing.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Strategic trade policy under free entry has also been analyzed in other frameworks. For example, Venables (1985) examined strategic subsidy and tax in the reciprocal dumping model under free entry and exit. Markusen and Venables (1988) compared the effects of trade policies in a segmented market with their effects in an integrated market. De Santis and Stähler (2001) examined optimal taxes and domestic production subsidies for exporting industries under free entry, assuming that domestic firms are not subject to competition by foreign firms in the domestic or foreign markets.

  2. 2.

    In developing countries, the following phenomenon is often observed: domestic firms enter into their respective markets, where exporters solely belonging to developed countries supply a good, and then the domestic firms compete against the foreign exporters.

  3. 3.

    This condition ensures that demand function is not too convex.

  4. 4.

    The derivation of (7.7) is shown in Appendix A.

  5. 5.

    We assume that all firms in the exporting country are viable in the short-run equilibrium.

  6. 6.

    From (7.10) and (7.13), the following result is derived: n 3 is an increasing function of Q, i.e., \(\tfrac{\partial n_{3}} {\partial Q}> 0\).

  7. 7.

    If π3 (Q) > 0 when n 3 = 1 and if there exists \(\bar{Q}\) such that \(p(\bar{Q}) = c_{3}'(0)\), then Q LR exists.

  8. 8.

    We assume that at least one importing firm exists in the market in the long-run equilibrium. We also assume that all firms in the exporting country are viable.

  9. 9.

    Matsumura and Kanda (2005) derived similar results from a mixed oligopoly model with private firms’ free entry. They pointed out that total output does not depend on any partial privatization level.

  10. 10.

    Etro’s (2011) original model is as follows: There are n exporting countries. One exporting firm exists in each country. All exporting firms supply their products in an international market. Country 1’s government alone subsidizes its firm. The number of exporting firms n is endogenously determined.

  11. 11.

    Hereafter, for simplicity, we will assume that all exporting firms have the same technology.

  12. 12.

    These equations are shown in Hayashibara (2002, p. 79). Note that domestic production subsidy is considered in Hayashibara’s (2002) model, which is regarded as our setting with the cost differences among firms considered essential.

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (no. 23530303 and 26380340). All remaining errors are ours.

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Correspondence to Takao Ohkawa .

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Appendix

Appendix

1.1 A. Derivation of (7.7)

From (7.2), we have pc′ = −pq j s j . Substituting this into (7.6) yields

$$ \displaystyle\begin{array}{rcl} p'q_{j} \frac{\partial Q} {\partial s_{j}} - (\,p'q_{j} + s_{j})\frac{\partial q_{j}} {\partial s_{j}} = 0.& & {}\\ \end{array} $$

The above equation can be translated into

$$ \displaystyle\begin{array}{rcl} p'q_{j}& & \left [n_{j}\frac{\partial q_{j}} {\partial s_{j}} + n_{k}\frac{\partial q_{k}} {\partial s_{j}} + n_{3}\frac{\partial q_{3}} {\partial s_{j}}\right ] - (\,p'q_{j} + s_{j})\frac{\partial q_{j}} {\partial s_{j}} = 0 \\ p'q_{j}& & \left [n_{k}\frac{\tfrac{\partial q_{k}} {\partial s_{j}} } {\tfrac{\partial q_{j}} {\partial s_{j}}} + n_{3}\frac{\tfrac{\partial q_{3}} {\partial s_{j}}} {\tfrac{\partial q_{j}} {\partial s_{j}}}\right ] - s_{j} + n_{j}p'q_{j}\left (1 - \frac{1} {n_{j}}\right ). {}\end{array}$$
(A7.1)

From (A7.1), we easily derive (7.7).

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Ohkawa, T., Hayashibara, M., Nomura, R., Okamura, M. (2016). Government Intervention Brings About Free-Trade Outcomes in the Long Run. In: Ohkawa, T., Tawada, M., Okamura, M., Nomura, R. (eds) Regional Free Trade Areas and Strategic Trade Policies. New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives, vol 10. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55621-3_7

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