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Merits and Demerits of the Structural Strategy: Its “Indispensable Negative Impact”

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Prescription for Social Dilemmas

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Abstract

Whether it is an environment, urban, or transportation problem, it is no exaggeration to say that at least in Japan, the authorities to solve social dilemmas have always discussed the application of structural strategies to facilitate cooperation or inhibit defection, such as introducing new facilities/administration systems or amending a tax system.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This diagram is based on a presumption that the following hypothesis is met: when the cooperation rate of others is provided as a condition, the (conditional) cooperation probability of each person is considered to be equal among individuals. However, we can develop exactly the same argument by defining this vertical axis as the “rate of people conducting a cooperative behavior (with a given condition of the cooperation rate of others)”, instead of the “probability of conducting a cooperative behavior”. When defined this way, we will allow the presence of individual differences in the (conditional) cooperation probability when the cooperation rate of others is provided as a given condition. Moreover, this graph will then indicate the collective rate of people conducting a cooperative behavior, with the given condition of the cooperation rate of others. In the main text, a graphical expression is based on the presumption of equality among individuals, but there is no reason other than just for explanatory convenience.

  2. 2.

    The discussion here considers the “Bad Apple Effect” not just as a theoretical concept to imply a phenomenon that defection spreads, but as a theoretical concept that implies that defection spreads to all people.

  3. 3.

    Here, we ignore the existence of interactions between Psy, Env, and x in order to simplify the explanation, but it is considered that such interactions exist in reality. However, even when we presuppose interactions, as long as the main effect exists in each of them, it is possible to make the same argument as discussed here.

  4. 4.

    The economist Thøgersen also theoretically explains the same situation in different wording. He pointed out that recycling behavior can be interpreted either as a matter attributed to the domain of morality or a matter attributed to the domain of economy. Having said that, he shows theoretically and empirically that introduction of a reward and sanctioning system will increase the tendency of people to interpret it as a matter attributed to the domain of economy (Thøgersen 1996).

  5. 5.

    The idea of road pricing was proposed by researchers who belong to the academic field of the so-called neoclassical economics in which it is considered that lying behind such concepts is a one-sided belief that “a human is a being who can only deal with problems as a business matter,” Therefore, if one discusses various social policies including road pricing only based on the framework of neoclassical economics, it is inevitable that due to the various “unexpected side effects” discussed here, the possibility of causing an “unexpected massive failure” is always lurking.

  6. 6.

    From the result of a questionnaire survey on attitudes to transportation policies conducted in six cities in Japan, it was indicated that among various structural strategies, the road pricing policy activates a self-centered motivation stronger than any other transportation policy, while decreasing social motivation (Fujii 2003a). This result implies a possibility that a structural strategy using “money” may shift people’s decision frame from an ethical to a business frame.

  7. 7.

    It is argued that just as the implementation of a policy based on economic theories actually creates the rational and selfish individuals presupposed by these theories, the mere behavior of learning the economic theories may create rational and selfish individuals. For instance, Frank et al. published an article titled as

    Does studying economics inhibit cooperation?

    In an academic journal of economics, Journal of Economic Perspective (Frank et al. 1993). Likewise, Marwell and Ames published an article titled

    Economists free ride, does anyone else?

    In an academic journal of economics, Journal of Public Economics (Marwell and Ames 1981).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Urban Management, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Kyoto, Japan

    Satoshi Fujii

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  1. Satoshi Fujii
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Correspondence to Satoshi Fujii .

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Fujii, S. (2017). Merits and Demerits of the Structural Strategy: Its “Indispensable Negative Impact”. In: Prescription for Social Dilemmas. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55618-3_9

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