Higher Order Social Dilemma in Response to a Structural Strategy: Public Acceptance, Public Opinion, Volunteers, and Justice
Whether to accept a structural strategy by behaving cooperatively and supporting its introduction, or to behave defectively and be against it, is a problem that embraces the very heart of any social dilemma.
KeywordsMonitoring System Public Opinion Structural Strategy Social Dilemma Public Acceptance
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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