Abstract
We conducted experiments in Vietnamese villages to determine the predictors of risk and time preferences. In villages with higher mean income, people are less loss-averse and more patient. Household income is correlated with patience but not with risk. We expand measurements of risk and time preferences beyond expected utility and exponential discounting, replacing those models with prospect theory and a three-parameter hyperbolic discounting model. Comparable risk parameter estimates have been found for Chinese farmers, using our method.
The original article first appeared in the American Economic Review 100(1):557–571, 2010. A newly written addendum has been added to this book chapter.
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Notes
- 1.
Discrete trust game was conducted before the risk and time discounting experiments. Trust outcomes were not revealed until the end of the session and are reported elsewhere.
- 2.
The 2002 living standard survey covers total 354,360 households in Vietnam. According to the local government officials in our research sites, lists of all households in selected villages were submitted to district offices, and households were randomly selected from the lists for the survey.
- 3.
Villages S1 and S3 are in Can Tho City, Village S2 is in Ca Mau Province, Villages S4 and S5 are in Tra Vinh Province, Villages N1 and N2 are in Vinh Phuc Province, and Villages N3 and N4 are in Thai Binh Province.
- 4.
The exchange rate between Vietnamese Dong and US Dollar does not fluctuate very much. On July 23 2005, the exchange rate was 15,880 Dong for one US Dollar, while it was 15,947 Dong for one Dollar on July 23, 2002.
- 5.
The instructions gave three examples. In one example a subject switches at the sixth question, in one example the subject chooses option A for all questions, and in one example the subject chooses Option B for all questions. The three examples were given to help ensure that subjects do not feel that they are forced to switch.
- 6.
Switching point 15 implies the subject never switched in that series.
- 7.
- 8.
We tested several instrumental variables e.g., funeral costs, natural disaster relief, crop failure due to natural disaster and pests, and selected rainfall and household head’s ability to work as instruments, since these variables yield the highest F-statistic in the regression.
- 9.
Jerry Hausman (1979), Emily C. Lawrance (1991) and Harrison et al. (2002) report this relation in the United States and Denmark. John L. Pender (1996), Nielsen (2001) and Yesuf (2004) also report it in India, Madagascar, and Ethiopia, respectively. Kris N. Kirby et al. (2002) and C. Leigh Anderson et al. (2004) did not find a wealth-patience relation in Bolivia and Vietnam, but their villages did not have as much income variation as we were able to design in by handpicking villages.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
The largest amount of y, 300,000 dong (about 19 dollars), is 15 days’ wages in the rural north.
- 14.
A referee suggested appropriately cautious wording: “There are many risks involved with leaving the money with the village head; one is that the village head will give out the money early, another is that the village head will keep the money for himself, another is that the village head will encourage those players who will be receiving a lot of money in the future to redistribute it within the village as earnings are no longer anonymous. These issues may affect the values of r, β, and θ in different ways. Given the difficulties in experimental design we did the best we can, and these are interesting issues for future research.”
- 15.
We excluded data from 3 subjects who made alternating responses across consecutive rows.
- 16.
t-tests of θ = 1 (quasi-hyperbolic discounting) and each of the restrictions ß = θ = 1 (exponential discounting) and ß = 1 and θ = 2 (hyperbolic discounting) reject all restrictions at p > 0.0001.
- 17.
The coefficients of explanatory variables for r (discount rates) are multiplied by 100.
- 18.
See Brown et al. (2009) for a review of quasi-hyperbolic model estimates.
- 19.
We also conducted regressions without the data of five subjects who were assigned the role of money delivery. There were few changes in regression results (see Table 1.11 in Appendix).
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Acknowledgments
This research was supported by a Behavioral Economics Small Grant from the Russell Sage Foundation, Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development, and internal Caltech funds to author Camerer. Comments from participants at the ESA meeting (October 2005), SEA meeting (November 2005), SJDM (November 2005), ASSA meeting (January 2007), audiences at Columbia, NYU, Bocconi, Emory, Hawaii, Caltech, UCSC, Claremont McKenna, Guelph, Carleton, Arizona State, a conference at UT-Dallas, and five thoughtful anonymous referees were helpful. Thanks to our research coordinators, Phan Dinh Khoi, Huynh Truong Huy, Nguyen Anh Quan, Nguyen Mau Dung, and research assistants, Bui Thanh Sang, Nguyen The Du, Ngo Nguyen Thanh Tam, Pham Thanh Xuan, Nguyen Minh Duc, Tran Quang Trung, and Tran Tat Nhat. We also thank Nguyen The Quan of the General Statistical Office, for allowing us to access the 2002 household survey data.
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Appendices
Appendix
Addendum: The Impacts of Risk Preferences on Technology Adoption in Agriculture
This addendum has been newly written by Tomomi Tanaka for this book chapter.
In the chapter entitled “Risk and time preferences: Linking experimental and household survey data from Vietnam”, we examined how basic preferences, namely risk and time preferences, are linked to wealth. We hypothesized that (1) risk averse people are reluctant to enter into risky but profitable economic activities, and (2) impatient people do not engage in long-term projects such as educating their children, so thus remain poor. We conducted risk and time discounting experiments in nine villages in Vietnam and investigated whether risk and time preferences correlate with income, relative income within village, and mean income of village. We found mean village income is correlated with risk and time preferences. People living in poor villages are not necessarily risk averse but they are loss averse. They also have higher discount rates, suggesting they are less patient. These results imply economic circumstances are important in shaping people’s preferences. On the other hand, household income is not strongly related to preferences. Lower income is linked to impatience (higher discount rates) but is not correlated with risk preferences. By conducting experiments in multiple villages with various mean income levels, we were able to investigate whether mean village income (economic environments) or absolute income levels are related with wealth. Our contribution was to show how to expand measurement of risk and time preference beyond expected utility and exponential discounting models, by replacing them with prospect theory and quasi-hyperbolic discounting models with present bias. However, we could not link these preferences with economic activities and decision making in productive activities.
Using our experimental design, Elaine M. Liu (2013) examine whether risk preferences can explain the difference in adoption of agricultural technology among Chinese farmers. Liu shows the adoption of genetically modified Bt cotton is slower among risk averse and loss averse farmers. Also, the farmers who overweight small probabilities adopt genetically modified Bt cotton earlier. Elaine M. Liu and JiKun Huang (2013) further examine whether risk preferences explain overuse of pesticides among these farmers. They show risk averse farmers overuse pesticides, but loss averse farmers use less amounts of pesticides. They hypothesize loss averse farmers are more concerned about the impact of pesticides use on health. The two studies extended our study by using the experimental design we developed in our study and linking risk preferences with actual economic activities, i.e., agricultural technology adoption.
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Tanaka, T., Camerer, C.F., Nguyen, Q. (2016). Risk and Time Preferences: Linking Experimental and Household Survey Data from Vietnam. In: Ikeda, S., Kato, H., Ohtake, F., Tsutsui, Y. (eds) Behavioral Economics of Preferences, Choices, and Happiness. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55402-8_1
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