Environmental R&D Organization in a Differentiated Cournot Duopoly
As global warming and environmental damage caused by pollution expand, it has become increasingly necessary to reduce pollution and improve environmental quality. Since the 1980s, numerous economists have devoted their research efforts to command-and-control regulation, tradable emission permits, emission tax, and so on. Furthermore, comparative research of environmental policies has been performed to date from the viewpoint of examining the incentives of innovating environmental technology and achieving the social optimum (Requate [13, 14]).
KeywordsSocial Welfare Environmental Damage Pollution Abatement Strategic Substitute Joint Profit
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