The Effect of Sharing Information on Learning Process in Experimental Duopoly Game: A Case from Indonesia

  • Manahan Siallagan
  • Shimaditya Nuraeni
Part of the Translational Systems Sciences book series (TSS, volume 10)


This article discusses the implementation of laboratory duopoly market in Indonesia. Some uniqueness of Indonesian context was seen during the experiment, e.g. the respondents tend to ignore the importance of sharing the result of flipped coin which may reduce the uncertainty of the outcome.

However, this result is based on post-graduate respondents only. Some various respondents may provide different results.


Aspiration Level Average Profitability Morning Session Afternoon Session Payoff Table 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Japan 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Business and ManagementInstitut Teknologi BandungWest JavaIndonesia

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