Abstract
In Chaps. 2–5, the Accident Investigation Committee grasped the facts of the accident process. Based on this, in Chap. 6, it analyzed and assessed where problems lay in the accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations, followed in Chap. 7 by analysis of the nuclear safety organizations.
This analysis and assessment aims to determine the root causes of this accident and boost efforts to prevent any repeat nuclear disasters by drawing lessons and providing recommendations to nuclear power stakeholders.
In this Chapter, the committee presents its view on the root causes and provides recommendations based on them. The main focus of the root cause analysis in 8.1 is on organizational issues. Recommendations are made in Sect. 8.2, in addition to those based on the results of root cause analysis and those from other perspectives, drawn from the analysis and assessment of Chaps. 6 and 7.
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The authority of government licenses before the accident was not the Director General of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency but the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.
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© 2015 Atomic Energy Society of Japan
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Atomic Energy Society of Japan. (2015). Root Causes of the Accident and Recommendations. In: The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55160-7_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55160-7_8
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Publisher Name: Springer, Tokyo
Print ISBN: 978-4-431-55159-1
Online ISBN: 978-4-431-55160-7
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