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Economic Exchange and Social Exchange

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From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance

Part of the book series: Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science ((EESCS,volume 20))

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Abstract

This chapter extends the analysis of approval theory to sociological exchange theory. In contrast to economic exchange, the network of social exchange makes binding constraints in and out of the organization. The market conditions outside of the organization, including “risk,” influences the internal structure of the organization. The interaction between the market and organization consists of the complex micro–macro linkages that emerge from both economic and social exchange.

Kiichiro Yagi, Keizai-teki Kokan to Shakai-teki Kokan: Seido Keizaigaku ni okeru Micro to Macro (Economic Exchange and Social Exchange: Micro and Macro in Institutional Political economy), Chiba Daigaku Keizai Kenkyu (Economic Studies of Chiba University), vol. 25, no. 3 (December 2010), pp. 113–146. Economics Society of Chiba University.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Prize announcement. The Sveriges Riskbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2009 (https://www.nobelprize.org).

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Correspondence to Kiichiro Yagi .

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Yagi, K. (2020). Economic Exchange and Social Exchange. In: Yagi, K. (eds) From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance. Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science, vol 20. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-54998-7_3

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