Evolution of Communication

  • Jun Tanimoto
Part of the Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science book series (EESCS, volume 6)


In this chapter, we discuss several interesting applications of evolutionary game theory. The chapter first takes up one possible scenario for why and how animal communication evolves. A series of numerical experiments based on an evolutionary game elucidates that one of the key points is time flexibility in the evolutionary trail. A social dilemma situation in a static environment only requires time-constant -reciprocity that can be emulated by Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) games, which does not give rise to any communication at all. On the other hand, a dynamic environment needs -reciprocity to solve a social dilemma. This compels communication to emerge among agents so that they can obtain a high payoff, leading to Fair Pareto optimum. This kind of constructivist approach suggests that a PD game seems less appropriate as an argument for the inception of communication, but Leader or Hero might be better.


Action Strategy Information Rate Alarm Call Social Dilemma Image Score 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Japan 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jun Tanimoto
    • 1
  1. 1.Graduate School of Engineering SciencesKyushu University InterdisciplinaryFukuokaJapan

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