Evolution of Communication
In this chapter, we discuss several interesting applications of evolutionary game theory. The chapter first takes up one possible scenario for why and how animal communication evolves. A series of numerical experiments based on an evolutionary game elucidates that one of the key points is time flexibility in the evolutionary trail. A social dilemma situation in a static environment only requires time-constant -reciprocity that can be emulated by Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) games, which does not give rise to any communication at all. On the other hand, a dynamic environment needs -reciprocity to solve a social dilemma. This compels communication to emerge among agents so that they can obtain a high payoff, leading to Fair Pareto optimum. This kind of constructivist approach suggests that a PD game seems less appropriate as an argument for the inception of communication, but Leader or Hero might be better.
KeywordsAction Strategy Information Rate Alarm Call Social Dilemma Image Score
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