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Fundamental Theory for Evolutionary Games

  • Jun Tanimoto
Part of the Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science book series (EESCS, volume 6)

Abstract

In this chapter, we take a look at the appropriate treatment of linear dynamical systems, which you may be familiar with if you have taken some standard engineering undergraduate classes. The discussion is then extended to non-linear systems and their general dynamic properties. In this discussion, we introduce the 2-player and 2-strategy (2 × 2) game, which is the most important archetype among evolutionary games. Multi-player and 2-strategy games are also introduced. In the latter parts of this chapter, we define the dilemma strength, which is useful for the universal comparison of the various reciprocity mechanisms supported by different models.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Equilibrium Point Payoff Matrix Replicator Dynamic Mutual Cooperation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Japan 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jun Tanimoto
    • 1
  1. 1.Graduate School of Engineering SciencesKyushu University InterdisciplinaryFukuokaJapan

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