Abstract
In this chapter, we discuss both the definition of an environmental system as one of the typical dynamical systems and its relation to evolutionary game theory. We also outline the structure of each chapter in this book.
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Notes
- 1.
The classical game theory assumes infinite population and perfect anonymity among those players. This is called well-mixed situation. Also, the players are presumed to act in an ideally rational way.
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Tanimoto, J. (2015). Human–Environment–Social System and Evolutionary Game Theory. In: Fundamentals of Evolutionary Game Theory and its Applications. Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science, vol 6. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-54962-8_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-54962-8_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Tokyo
Print ISBN: 978-4-431-54961-1
Online ISBN: 978-4-431-54962-8
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