Historical Reviews Around Evolving Ideas of the Invisible Hand

  • Yuji Aruka
Part of the Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science book series (EESCS, volume 1)


This book aims to identify several points at which new economic theories diverged from the old by providing an overview of the traditional theories. The market is now dominated by the influence of financial speculation. That is to say, speculation has long since passed its original function. We can no longer remain in the domain of traditional definitions around markets. So our retrospection of traditional economics is limited to special interests. We do, however, give a quick characterization of the economy first, and we will then discuss historical ideas.


Financial Market Reputation System Neoclassical Economic Invisible Hand Ordinary Life 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Japan 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yuji Aruka
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of CommerceChuo UniversityHachioijiJapan

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