Abstract
This chapter evaluates a new mechanism for matching service in perishable goods by using the experimental economics method. This new mechanism employs a double-sided auction mechanism, in which buyers and sellers bid on both prices and date to trade. When compared to another type of double-sided auction mechanism, called the time criticality-based mechanism, this new mechanism achieves more truthful bidding of a date to trade and trading prices that are closer to the market equilibrium prices. However, the new mechanism is less efficient economically because there are fewer transactions.
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Akai, K., Hayashida, K., Nishino, N. (2014). New Mechanism for Matching Service in Perishable Goods Trade: An Approach Using Economic Experiments. In: Mochimaru, M., Ueda, K., Takenaka, T. (eds) Serviceology for Services. ICServ 2013. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-54816-4_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-54816-4_7
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