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New Mechanism for Matching Service in Perishable Goods Trade: An Approach Using Economic Experiments

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Abstract

This chapter evaluates a new mechanism for matching service in perishable goods by using the experimental economics method. This new mechanism employs a double-sided auction mechanism, in which buyers and sellers bid on both prices and date to trade. When compared to another type of double-sided auction mechanism, called the time criticality-based mechanism, this new mechanism achieves more truthful bidding of a date to trade and trading prices that are closer to the market equilibrium prices. However, the new mechanism is less efficient economically because there are fewer transactions.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-Ku, Tokyo, 113-8656, Japan

    Kenju Akai & Nariaki Nishino

  2. Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan

    Kengo Hayashida

Authors
  1. Kenju Akai
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  2. Kengo Hayashida
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  3. Nariaki Nishino
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kenju Akai .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, Koto-ku, Tokyo, Japan

    Masaaki Mochimaru  & Takeshi Takenaka  & 

  2. The University of Tokyo, Kashiwa, Chiba, Japan

    Kanji Ueda

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Akai, K., Hayashida, K., Nishino, N. (2014). New Mechanism for Matching Service in Perishable Goods Trade: An Approach Using Economic Experiments. In: Mochimaru, M., Ueda, K., Takenaka, T. (eds) Serviceology for Services. ICServ 2013. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-54816-4_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-54816-4_7

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Tokyo

  • Print ISBN: 978-4-431-54815-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-4-431-54816-4

  • eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)

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