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Repeated and Dynamic Games

  • Akio Matsumoto
  • Ferenc Szidarovszky
Chapter

Abstract

In this chapter repeated and dynamic games will be discussed in which the players know the strategy sets and payoff functions of all players, that is, the game has complete information. It is also assumed that at each time period each player knows the complete history of the game which consists of the past strategy selections and corresponding payoff values of all players. It means that the game also has perfect information.

Keywords

Payoff Function Extensive Form Equilibrium Strategy Perfect Information Dynamic Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Copyright information

© Springer Japan 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicChuo UniversityHachiojiJapan
  2. 2.Department of Applied MathematicsUniversity of PécsPécsHungary

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