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Completeness of a Deduction System for Relational Information between Ciphertexts Based on Probabilistic Computational Semantics

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Theory and Practice of Computation

Abstract

We proposed a system called JD-system for deducing relational information between contents or keys of two ciphertexts, such as “the contents of two ciphertexts are equal” or “the keys of two ciphertexts are different”. JD-system can be used as a symbolical analysis method, which is simple and easy to understand since it is regarded as abstract-level analysis by discarding a phenomenon of which probability is negligible. However, it is not clear whether JD-system is correct in the computational model where encrypted information is deciphered by computation of probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines. In this paper, we introduce JD-system and give computational semantics to it. We also show its soundness and completeness, which are the property that we cannot deduce relational information by JD-system, if and only if it is impossible to obtain its evidence except with negligible probability by the computation.

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Hagihara, S., Oguro, H., Yonezaki, N. (2012). Completeness of a Deduction System for Relational Information between Ciphertexts Based on Probabilistic Computational Semantics. In: Nishizaki, Sy., Numao, M., Caro, J., Suarez, M.T. (eds) Theory and Practice of Computation. Proceedings in Information and Communications Technology, vol 5. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-54106-6_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-54106-6_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Tokyo

  • Print ISBN: 978-4-431-54105-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-4-431-54106-6

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