Abstract
This chapter examines the political processes in the enactment and implementation of the Act on Asbestos Health Damage Relief in 2006. A lot of earlier studies on asbestos problems have examined and clarified the state of asbestos-related health damage, the negative influences on society, and so forth. However, the political impact caused by asbestos disasters, especially the Kubota Shock (June 2005), has not been elucidated in detail. The political process approach is supposed to make up for a lack of comprehensive understanding of the asbestos issue. Based mainly on the Asahi Shimbun database and official documents, I explore how such diverse stakeholders as the ruling party, core government executives, ministries and government offices, companies, and local governments have mutually struggled and considered the measures over the asbestos issues.
Translated and revised from the Japanese original, Mori, M. (2008). Process Tracing of Asbestos Politics in Japan: Focus on Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006. Policy Science (in Japanese), Supplementary Volume, 203–225, with permission of the Policy Science Association of Ritsumeikan University.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
Table 10.1 lists the number of newspaper articles in an Asahi Shimbun database on the so-called school panic and Kubota Shock over a 2-year period that contained the words “asbestos” and/or “ishiwata,” the original Japanese term for asbestos. There were 119 such articles on the school panic (FY 1987–1988) and 3512 articles on the Kubota Shock (FY 2005–2006). The number of articles containing these terms averaged 74 per year throughout the entire postwar period (FY 1945–2006), three per year from 1945 (the year World War II ended) to 1986 (the year prior to the school panic), and 51 per year in the period from 1989 to 2004 (the year prior to the Kubota Shock). Although these statistics are nothing more than examples, they do support the conjecture that among postwar asbestos-related problems, both of these events received significant news coverage, and the latter in particular had an enormous impact.
- 2.
For my discussion of these points with consideration of the conclusions of earlier studies, including the literature listed in Note 4, see Mori, M. (2008). That discussion may be summarized as follows (Translated from Japanese). “Regardless of whether or not the government’s position is labeled as ‘inaction,’ at a minimum the justifications for governmental policies on this issue are demonstrably flawed. Additionally, I contend that the flaws were in the administrative and core executive branches of government, not the political party (the ruling party). Specifically, it is shown that the key to exploring current asbestos-related issues resides in an understanding of the absence of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) involvement (a ‘political vacuum’) in policy affairs relating to the labor environment and air quality, and behind-the-scenes LDP maneuvering (‘hidden politics’) in the realm of policy on economic issues. Further, as a theoretical basis for this interpretation, it is argued that features of the asbestos problem and inter-related linkages within the policy arena intentionally or unintentionally limit the policy preferences, strategy formulations, and behavior of key actors at the government level, and substantially prescribe the outcomes.” (pp. 45–46) In this chapter, I discuss the features of Japan’s politico-historical “shock within a shock” as an extension of the aforementioned concerns (see Note 1).
- 3.
Numerous publications have reported in detail on the activities of asbestos victims and their supporters. However, documentation produced to explain trends at the government level is unusually scarce. Although it only covers the period up to late November 2005, Awano (2006) provides useful insights, with a focus on political developments, while also taking into account the activities of victims and support groups. While Awano pursues several themes, his discussion complements the chronological arrangement of subject matter in this chapter. The following work is instructive for its presentation of asbestos-related issues within the context of an analysis of government efforts to re-regulate society (see Nottage 2006).
- 4.
This trend remained consistent even if the periods prior to and after those covered by Table 10.1 are factored in: for example, the first 3 months of 2005 (3, 4, and 9 instances of usage, respectively) and the months of April through September 2007 (with 39, 49, 42, 29, 23, and 29 instances, respectively).
- 5.
For a convenient reference, see Ryu (1988).
- 6.
- 7.
Kamikawa (2007). In addition, Kamikawa points out that Koizumi’s power base shifted from a Cabinet consensus to a top-down approach after the general election.
- 8.
For more recent details on the Kubota Shock, see Kataoka (2006).
- 9.
The following was referenced for press documentation on “National governors’ Association,” http://www.nga.gr.jp/upload/pdf/2005_7_x68.PDF. Accessed 30 October 2007.
- 10.
In other Diet debates, during intensive deliberations by the Special Subcommittee for the Promotion of Science and Technology, attention was focused on points made by committee member Hidekatsu Yoshii (the Japanese Communist Party). Specifically, Yoshii described the government position as analogous to the defensive response given by the director of the MHLW’s Public Health Bureau in 1972 when asked to explain the harm caused by the exposure of local residents to asbestos dust. On that occasion, the director explained that the risk of actual harm had been circumvented, but that if the risk persisted, health examinations for citizens should be considered (Asahi Shimbun Newspaper, July 21, 2005).
- 11.
Further information on this document and other national government-level material covered therein were examined on the official website of the prime minister’s residence, under the heading “Cabinet-level conference on the asbestos problem,” http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/asbestos/index.html, Accessed October 30, 2007.
- 12.
That is not to say there was nothing worthy of notice. Reference materials for the “Interim Measures” demonstrated that government action in the past chiefly comprised administrative guidance in the form of notices and advisories. Of the 73 notices and advisories on asbestos which the government had issued up to March 2005, 23 were determined to have been issued in the period from 1987 through 1988 alone, when the so-called school panic was at its height. On this point, one retired MHLW veteran commented that perhaps the bureaucracy thought it could control the industry with advisories alone. By some accounts, though, the industry generally ignored them in practice (Asahi Shimbun Newspaper, July 30, 2005). The following episode serves as evidence of just how “lax” the policy of advisory-based administrative guidance could be. In a meeting of the Committee in the House of Representatives on Health, Labor, and Welfare that convened immediately after a related meeting of Cabinet ministers, the Director of the Labor Standards Bureau had to apologize for his failure to examine an advisory that had been issued in a junior manager’s name for the purpose of relaxing the application procedure for workers accident compensation insurance benefits. This episode apparently left patients, their families, and their supporters with the clear impression of a lack of transparency when it came to matters of administrative accountability.
- 13.
Awano (2006) is a representative example in the literature on this topic.
- 14.
For example, consider Kitayama (1995).
- 15.
See Asahi Shimbun Newspaper (August 27, 2005) for one synopsis of the points made in ministry and agency documents.
- 16.
At the time, Prime Minister Koizumi was preoccupied with putting his utmost into the drive to privatize the postal service, and apparently this was the only occasion when he had anything to say about the asbestos issue. Indeed, as pointed out by Nottage, Koizumi may not have had any time or latitude to obsess about this matter (Nottage, 2006: 252). However, that is not to say he was simply unconcerned because, as indicated earlier, asbestos countermeasures were one of the seven priorities listed in his party’s manifesto for the September 11 general election. Indeed, considering the context, the fact that Koizumi commented on asbestos at all may in itself be taken as something quite significant. Here, the point is to affirm that Koizumi was neither indifferent nor actively opposed to asbestos countermeasures.
- 17.
A follow-up epidemiological survey of this district identified mesothelioma death rates of 18.1 times the national average for women, 9.8 times the national average for men, and 11.7 times the national average for both genders combined, thus highlighting the dangerous situation in the community surrounding the Kubota factory (Asahi Shimbun Newspaper, November 24, 2005).
- 18.
However, spot inspections of private businesses by the MHLW reportedly uncovered a significant number of regulatory violations, thus placing the viability of these plans into doubt.
- 19.
The course of this debate also mattered in terms of the impact it could have on the victim relief efforts pursued by individual companies. In general, whereas victims of asbestos contamination attributable to Kubota, NICHIAS, or other comparably large-scale firms could expect to receive generous amounts of compensation, that was not the case for victims of asbestos contamination caused by small-scale businesses. Indeed, considering that even NICHIAS – then the largest firm in the asbestos industry – had declared that the burden of victim compensation was too large for any single company(Asahi Shimbun Newspaper, September 30, 2005), one can readily imagine how smaller firms felt about the issue. Determining who would bear the compensation funding burden, how much of the burden they would share, and the channels through which their contributions would be made were all realistic questions that demanded solutions.
- 20.
Kent Weaver (1986). For example, if the ruling party had been exposed to criticism in the questionnaire survey cited earlier, the party’s behavior could have been perceived as not claiming credit, but avoiding blame.
- 21.
Within the context of requests and expectations toward the proposed legislation, it is worth noting that Hannan City in Osaka Prefecture, which historically had a high concentration of asbestos-related industries, had asked the MOE, MHLW, and MLIT to designate it a district with relief priority.
- 22.
These steps were not limited to Kubota. NICHIAS reportedly sustained the trend by having 486 workers at its Gifu facility undergo health examinations, thus setting the stage for the industry to benefit from a show of action. Later on, NICHIAS subsidiary Tatsuta Kogyou would begin making its first payments of condolence money.
- 23.
Air Pollution Control Law, Building Standards Law, Waste Disposal and Cleaning Law, and Local Finance Law were all amended and revised when the New Act was established. Although these developments were also important, they were outside the scope of this chapter.
- 24.
According to the Asahi Shimbun Newspaper, compared with trends in FY 2004, the number of applications for workers accident insurance ballooned eightfold, with an increase of over twofold in those actually approved (April 5, 2006). By MHLW estimates, the number of applications rose around 9-fold, with those which were approved being almost 4 times the corresponding level in FY 2004 (May 31, 2006). Furthermore, it is assumed that there was also a sharp surge in the volume of work involved in processing these applications. A spokesperson for the Compensation Division in the Workers Compensation Department of the MHLW noted that because the period to the onset of symptoms in most cases of mesothelioma was so long, patients and their health-care providers rarely made any associations between this disease and the patient’s occupational history. Although the Division made an effort to familiarize patients and health-care facilities with asbestos-linked illnesses and the workers accident.
- 25.
See the Asahi Shimbun Newspaper (March 5, 2007) for similar cases concerned with the approval of patients with asbestos-linked lung cancer.
- 26.
Although cases of litigation have not been adequately covered in this chapter, they can be cited for their importance to political and public administration-related research on the power of the courts. (I have included some notes on the paper listed above.) Some court-related developments are briefly listed here. In April 2006, the Osaka pneumoconiosis and asbestos legal team filed the first class-action lawsuit, and as briefly mentioned in the introduction section of this chapter, sought damage compensation from the national government. Around this time, a series of pneumoconiosis-related lawsuits concluded in victory for the plaintiffs, and there were impressions this would have an impact on the outcome of asbestos-related litigation as well. Although one case is currently pending in the Osaka District Court, future developments will be closely followed.
- 27.
However, in the Asahi article, the reporter adds that MOE officials considered Kubota to be a cause of many workplace accidents, and surmised that its decision on compensation reflected an awareness that local residents shared the same view. The reporter concludes that Kubota had in reality conceded that causal links exist (Asahi Shimbun Newspaper April 18, 2007).
- 28.
The headings of various editorials published by leading papers on April 19, 2006, read as follows; “Kubota finds its resolve, but ….” (Asahi Shimbun Newspaper); “Kubota quickly decides to pay relief compensation” (Yomiuri Shimbun Newspaper); “After asbestos compensation, what next for Kubota?” (Nihon Keizai Shimbun Newspaper); “‘Kubota-style’ asbestos relief compensation serves as a model” (Mainichi Shimbun Newspaper).
- 29.
Afterward, Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. apparently paid surviving families compensation sums of close to 60 million yen. In addition, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. reportedly did away with age discrimination in the payment of condolence money.
- 30.
For further details on this factor, see the Asahi Shimbun Newspaper feature series, “The Kubota Shock one year later” (June 27–29, 2006).
- 31.
There are many other related examples, including those involving such firms as Mitsubishi Materials Corp., Sumitomo Heavy Industries, Ltd., and Bridgestone Corp. Another example, albeit different, is a reported increase in the number of former employees of the Nagasaki Shipyard and Machinery Works of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, who have become victims of asbestos-linked illnesses and have received asbestos health management handbooks.
- 32.
Let me make a point relating to local government. It is well known that decisions made at the national government level are not always implemented at the local level. One example would be the subsidies budgeted by the MLIT for the prevention of asbestos dust dispersal from private structures. In some cases, prefectural frameworks for the provision of these subsidies have not been set up. As of November 2006, 11 prefectures had completed their subsidy frameworks, 11 had no plans to develop them, and 18 more were either in the framework development or study stages. According to an analysis by the Asahi Shimbun Newspaper (February 6, 2007), the main reason cited for this state of affairs is that the prefectures have been asked to provide half of the subsidy funding, and certain quarters are still discontented and feel that the national government should assume the entire burden of funding because its regulatory policies have failed. Taken together with reports that the National Governors’ Association has been divided over the burden of funding for medical costs and condolence money payments under the New Act, these examples may be interpreted as independent manifestations of resistance.
- 33.
One document supporting the interpretations in this paper from a risk-awareness research-based approach is Nakayachi (2005). Although Nakayachi’s analysis is focused on Kubota’s response to the asbestos crisis, it contains insights that apply to an analysis of the political and administrative dimensions from the perspective of “restoring public trust.”
- 34.
The previously cited Mori paper chiefly explored trends in the National Diet debate. See Note 2.
- 35.
References
Awano M (2006) Asbestos disaster (in Japanese). Shueisha, Tokyo
Falleti T (2006) Theory-guided process-tracing: something old, something new. Newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics of the American Political Science Association 17(1):9–14
Iio J (2006) Japan’s structure of government (in Japanese). Chuokoron Shinsha, Tokyo
Japan Industrial Safety and Health Association (2005) Ordinance on prevention of asbestos hazards (in Japanese). Japan Industrial Safety and Health Association, Tokyo
Kamikawa R (2007) Transformation of the policy process after the election of 2005 (in Japanese). Jpn J Elect Stud 22:54–68
Kataoka A (2006) The backdrop to the asbestos disaster at Kubota’s defunct Kanzaki factory in Amagasaki City: facing a reality far worse than imagined. Res Environ Disruption (in Japanese) 35(3):49–54
Kent Weaver R (1986) The politics of blame avoidance. J Public Policy 6:369–398
Kitayama T (1995) Local policy initiatives. In: Muramatsu M, Kume I, Iqbal F (eds) Local government development in post-war Japan. Oxford University Press, Tokyo, pp 222–241
Kurumatani N, Kumagai S (2006) A significant clustering of mesotheliomas among residents around an old asbestos type production plant: epidemiologic aspect and bitter lesson. J Occup Health (in Japanese) 48:143–145
Machidori S (2005) Political reforms and their impact on the long administration by Prime Minister Koizumi. Chuokoron (in Japanese) 120(4):176–186
Machidori S (2006) The strong Prime Minister’ becomes common. Chuokoron (in Japanese) 121(4):174–184
Mori M (2008) Strategic environmental regulations? A case of asbestos politics in postwar Japan. Kagawa Law Rev (in Japanese) 8(1):43–129
Nakayachi K (2005) Why was Kubota forgiven? The asbestos crisis as reflected in corporate responses and environmental risk psychology. Risk Manag Bus (in Japanese) 20(11):20–23
Nottage L (2006) The ABCs of product safety re-regulation in Japan: asbestos, buildings, consumer electrical goods and Schindler’s lifts. Griffith Law Rev 15(2):242–286
Otake H (1996) Political and economic power in contemporary Japan, expanded edition (in Japanese). San-ichi Shobo, Tokyo
Otake H (2006) A study of populism: Koizumi Jun-ichiro (in Japanese). Toyo Keizai, Tokyo
Ryu K (1988) The concept of ‘pre-decision’ in the policy making process. Kyoto Law Rev (in Japanese) 123(4):48–71; 124(1):91–125
Takenaka H (2006) The Prime Minister’s rule (in Japanese). Chuokoron Shinsha, Tokyo
Uchiyama Y (2007) Koizumi administration (in Japanese). Chuokoron Shinsha, Tokyo
Yamaguchi J (2007) The Cabinet system (in Japanese). University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2011 Springer
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Mori, M. (2011). Process Tracing of Asbestos Politics in Japan: Focus on Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006. In: Miyamoto, K., Morinaga, K., Mori, H. (eds) Asbestos Disaster. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-53915-5_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-53915-5_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Tokyo
Print ISBN: 978-4-431-53914-8
Online ISBN: 978-4-431-53915-5
eBook Packages: Earth and Environmental ScienceEarth and Environmental Science (R0)